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HEALTH ACCOUNTS/ARRANGEMENTS: AN
EXPANDING ROLE UNDER THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT?
EDWARD A. MORSE 1
This article outlines the foundations of health-related
accounts and arrangements, including tax and economic
considerations affecting their role in various designs for
health insurance coverage. It explores the impact of the
Affordable Care Act and related administrative guidance
affecting their usage, arguing that emerging trends showing
that insured patients are bearing increasingly significant
levels of out-of-pocket costs suggest an expanding role for
consumer-directed accounts and arrangements, albeit one
clouded by looming excise taxes imposed on “excess benefit”
coverage beginning in 2018. It also examines the potential to
utilize health accounts/arrangements to resolve moral and
ethical conflicts in healthcare policy. Building on a suggestion
by Professor Zelinsky, this article argues that an expanded
approach to using health accounts/arrangements could
enhance freedom not only for religious employers, but also for
nonreligious employers concerned about respecting the
religious beliefs of their employees.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Health-related spending/saving accounts and arrangements,
consisting of health savings accounts (HSAs), health flexible
spending arrangements (health FSAs), and health reimbursement
arrangements (HRAs), are widely used to help patients fund their
healthcare costs. Recent data shows that approximately 21 percent
of all civilian workers had access to an HSA and 40 percent had
access to health FSAs through their employers. 2 Workers at larger
firms generally have even higher access rates, as 29 percent of
employees at firms with 500 or more workers had access to HSAs
and 71 percent had access to health FSAs. 3
Although widely available, these health accounts/
arrangements fund only a small portion of annual personal
healthcare costs, most of which are funded through government
and private insurance. Data compiled by the federal government
show total personal healthcare expenditures of $2.186 trillion in
2010. 4 Of this total, 77.9 percent (about $1.7 trillion) was financed
by health insurance, including private and government programs,
while 13.7 percent ($299.7 billion) was financed by out-of-pocket
payments. 5 Of these total out-of-pocket payments, it is likely that
health accounts/arrangements fund less than one-seventh of this
amount. 6
2. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2013 tbl. 41 (2013)
[hereinafter BLS], available at www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2013/ebbl0052.pdf
(showing “Heathcare reimbursement account” under “Section 125 cafeteria
benefits,” which as discussed below, reflects health FSAs).
3. Id.
4. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2012, at 325 tbl. 114 (2013), available at www.cdc.gov/nchs
/data/hus/2012/114.pdf (showing $2.186 trillion in personal health care
expenditures in 2010).
5. Id.
6. According to one recent study, the combined total balance of HRAs and
HSAs for 2012 was approximately $17.8 billion. Paul Fronstin, Health Savings
Accounts and Health Reimbursement Arrangements: Assets, Account Balances,
and Rollovers, 2006-2012, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE ISSUE
BRIEF, 382, at 4 (2013). This does not necessarily reflect the total annual
payments from such accounts, but even if we assume this entire balance would
be distributed in a single year it would comprise no more than 6 percent of
out-of-pocket funding based on the 2010 spending level of $299.7 billion. For
health FSAs, annual contribution data is more difficult to come by, but annual
contributions would necessarily approximate annual spending due to the “useor-lose” requirement imposed on these accounts. See Janemarie Mulvey,
Health Care Flexible Spending Accounts, CONG. RES. SERV. 7-5700, at 5 (2012)
(stating that “[f]ew surveys ask about FSAs, and those that do obtain only
limited information.”); id. at 7 (discussing “use it or lose it” requirement).
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Health saving/spending accounts and arrangements
nevertheless provide an important source of liquidity for patients
to cover a sizable sum of these out-of-pocket costs. They may also
provide other benefits, including a small measure of cost
containment through conferring autonomy on the patient (albeit in
varying degrees) to select and pay providers directly through funds
they either own or control, instead of through an insurance
intermediary. 7
Health saving/spending accounts and arrangements predate
the Affordable Care Act (ACA), and only a few provisions in the
ACA target these accounts directly. 8 However, it appears that the
Nevertheless, a rough estimate may be constructed as follows: 124,992,900
civilian workers (BLS, supra note 2) *.40 (availability rate per BLS, supra note
2) * .37 (participation rate in 2009 per Mercer study, Mulvey, supra) *$1420
(2009 average contribution among participating employees per Mercer study,
Mulvey, supra) = $26.3 billion. Combining these two figures ($17.8 billion +
$26.3 billion = $44.1 billion) would produce approximately one-seventh of outof-pocket costs based on 2010 spending levels. (i.e., $44.1 billion / $299.7
billion = 14.71%).
7. See, e.g., William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and
Cross-Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEMPHIS
L. REV. 279, 369-70 (2009) (noting that “[t]he third-party payment system that
consumers finance has produced a health care system with perverse incentives
for them to overconsume with little concern for the value they receive for the
price that they ultimately pay . . . [w]hen consumers understand that they
provide the funds that others disburse to health care providers, they will
demand more net value from all of the health care services for which they pay.
Maximization of such net value will require some form of consumer-driven
health care (“CDHC”) wherein consumers directly pay for the health care they
receive and reap savings when they choose less expensive alternatives. CDHC
will cause consumers to reward only those health care providers who
successfully compete for their custom.”); Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and
Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TULANE L. REV. 777, 792
(2006) (stating that “[t]he theory behind CDHPs [consumer-driven health
plans] is that individuals should be incentivized to act as consumers when
they purchase medical services. That is, individuals should be taught to
approach medical care purchasing decisions like they approach the purchasing
decision for any other consumer good. The consumer must perform a costbenefit analysis and, taking into account her limited resources, decide which
goods will maximize her utility.”) As will be discussed below, the savings
dimensions permitted in HSAs and HRAs contribute to this incentive
structure in a way that is not present with health FSA’s. Id. However, all
three accounts permit some consumer autonomy outside of a system controlled
by insurance providers. It should also be noted that while consumer-driven
plans often focus on change in the demand side of the healthcare equation
(which, admittedly, is not always elastic), some supply side effects may also
occur, including attention to more cost-effective care options. Id. at 803. Cost
savings may also be possible through enhancing the speed of payment to
providers who prefer the rapid access to payment through a direct electronic
payment mechanisms utilized with consumer driven accounts, as compared
with longer payment processes through insurance intermediaries. Based on
experience of the author, some providers offer discounts for cash payments,
including electronic payments from an HSA, for this reason.
8. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title IX, § 9003, 124 Stat. 119, 854 (restricting
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ACA is producing other transformative effects on financing
healthcare, which suggest that an expanded role for consumerdriven accounts – and particularly for the HSA – may be coming.
As implementation of the ACA unfolds, it appears that patients
who are covered by health insurance will bear increasingly
significant levels of out-of-pocket costs. Although the ACA sets an
upper limit on such costs – for 2014, total out-of-pocket expenses
are capped at $6,350 (single) and $12,700 (family) 9 – other
features of the ACA, including expanded minimum benefits, repeal
of annual and lifetime benefit limits, and community rating
limitations, have translated into an environment of rising
premium costs for private health insurance. In order to find ways
to keep premiums affordable, insurers have resorted to raising
deductibles and co-payments to the extent permitted by law, 10
continuing a recent trend toward expanding patient responsibility
for healthcare payments. 11
When given the choice, it appears that many employers and
consumers prefer to accept the tradeoff of greater personal
responsibility for future health care costs in the form of
deductibles and co-payments in order to reduce current outlays for
insurance premiums. 12 Such preferences are rational and prudent
medical expense distributions for medicine and drugs other than a prescribed
drug or insulin); id. § 9005, 124 Stat. 854-55 (restricting qualified benefits
through a health FSA to an annual salary reduction of $2,500).
9. Rev. Proc. 2013-25, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1110.
10. See, e.g., Leslie Scism and Timothy W. Martin, Higher Deductibles Fuel
New Worries of Health-Law Sticker Shock, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2013, available
at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230333020457924621
1560398876 (noting that the average individual deductible for a bronze plan
on an exchange is $5,081/year, 42% higher than the $3,589 average in 2013
before the ACA went into effect).
11. See INSTAMED, TRENDS IN HEALTHCARE PAYMENT ANNUAL REPORT, at
4 (2012), available at www.instamed.com/wp-content/uploads/Trends-inHealthcare-Payments-Annual-Report-2011.pdf (noting that, between 2010 and
2012, percentage of payments coming from private third party payers declined
from 23% to 20%, attributing difference to increased patient responsibility).
12. The ACA recognizes this tendency by permitting those under 30 and
others for whom insurance coverage might otherwise be unaffordable to
purchase catastrophic coverage (albeit without premium subsidies) in order to
avoid penalties for being uninsured. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(e), 124
Stat 119, 168 (2010) and 26 CFR § 156.155 (describing “Enrollment in
catastrophic plans”). See also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;
Health Insurance Market Rules; Rate Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 70584, 70586
(Nov. 26, 2012) (noting that “[a]dditionally, young adults and people for whom
coverage would otherwise be unaffordable will have access to a catastrophic
plan that will have a lower premium, protect against high out-of-pocket costs,
and cover recommended preventive services without cost sharing.”). Secretary
Sebelius has also granted an administrative exemption expanding the scope of
permitted catastrophic coverage to those facing cancellation of existing
coverage under the act. Letter from Kathleen Sebelius to [Senator] Mark R.
Warner, at 2 (Dec. 19, 2013), available at www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/fact
sheets/2013/12/letter-to-senator.pdf.
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if the combined outlays for insurance and out-of-pocket costs
remain affordable. However, for patients without access to these
health accounts, these out-of-pocket costs must be paid from aftertax earnings, if they can be paid at all. 13 After all, even insured
patients may externalize costs to others if they lack the means to
pay them. By imposing additional constraints on itemized
deductions for medical expenses, 14 the ACA has modestly
enhanced the value of income tax incentives for establishing
health accounts and arrangements that allow medical expenses to
be paid from pretax earnings. 15 The potential for Social
Security/Medicare tax avoidance also incentivizes employers to
provide health benefits, which continues in the post-ACA
environment. 16
While each of these accounts offer similar opportunities for
tax savings, other changes in the post-ACA environment are
making HSAs relatively more attractive than their counterparts.
The ACA provides an additional nudge away from plans using
health FSAs and toward those using HSAs by capping the annual
employee contribution limits for FSAs at $2,500 beginning in 2013,
which is well below the permitted contribution levels for HSAs. 17
ACA changes involving so-called “market reforms” have also
affected the ability of employers to offer health FSA and HRAs
that are not integrated with employer-provided healthcare plans. 18
HSAs are not affected by these requirements.
Finally, ACA provisions designed to impose a 40 percent
excise tax on plans with “excess benefit” coverage beginning in
2018 19 will also likely reinforce the trend toward patient
13. Uncompensated care, defined to include both the cost of bad debt and
charity care, totaled more than $41 billion in community hospitals in 2011 – or
about 5.9% of their total expenses. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,
UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE FACT SHEET, at 3 (2013), available at
www.aha.org/content/13/1-2013-uncompensated-care-fs.pdf (providing these
statistics). This total does not include uncompensated care outside of
hospitals, such as through private doctors or clinics. Moreover, this total does
not include the underpayment reflected in government reimbursements for
Medicare and Medicaid patients, which according to the AHA, totaled $56
billion in 2012. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, UNDERPAYMENT BY
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET, at 3 (2014), available at
www.aha.org/content/14/2012-medicare-med-underpay.pdf
(providing
the
amount of underpayments omitted). Thus, it appears that government
underpayments are a larger financial problem than uncompensated care from
private patients.
14. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title IX, § 9013, 124 Stat 119, 868 (increasing
AGI limitation in I.R.C. § 213 from 7.5% to 10% for taxpayers other than
seniors effective in 2013).
15. See infra part II.A.3 (discussing income tax).
16. See infra part II.A.4 (discussing employment tax).
17. I.R.C. § 125(i) (2004), as added by Pub. L. No. 111-148, Title IX, § 9005,
124 Stat 119, 855 (2010).
18. Notice 2013-53, I.R.B. 2013-36, discussed in part II.C., infra.
19. I.R.C. § 4980I (2010).
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responsibility. Cost-conscious employers may find a high
deductible health plan coupled with an HSA to be an attractive
alternative for delivering health benefits to their employees in
compliance with the ACA, while lowering outlays for health
insurance. 20
This article will examine the current rules and incentives for
using health-related spending/savings/reimbursement accounts
and their role in the healthcare structure produced by the ACA.
Part II provides an overview of salient features of each kind of
account or arrangement, along with changes imposed by the ACA
that may affect their utility. Part III explores the cost environment
for choosing high deductible health plans (HDHP) compared to
other common insurance products and the potential costs and
benefits from HSA participation, along with some other trends
that favor an expanded role for HDHP/HSA utilization. Part IV
explores the potential for an HDHP/HSA approach toward
resolving emerging conflicts over moral and ethical concerns over
healthcare in a pluralistic society. Finally, Part V offers some
concluding remarks.

II. HEALTH ACCOUNTS AND ARRANGEMENTS: A
STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW
Despite similar roles in financing healthcare, HSAs, health
FSAs, and their close cousins, HRAs differ in important respects.
Independent legal requirements erect practical constraints on
utility, which must be considered in the design of any health plan
that includes them. Part A discusses HSAs, while Parts B and C
discuss health FSAs and HRAs, respectively.

A. HSAs
HSAs were formally approved as part of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003. 21
Accordingly, they could not effectively be implemented before plan
years for 2004. HSAs are an expanded and more flexible version of
a similar concept, the Archer Medical Savings Account (MSA),
which originated in 1996 as a pilot project available only to selfemployed persons and to employees of a small employer covered by
a high deductible health plan. 22 Key features of HSA participation
are explored below.

20. See infra part III.C (discussing tax benefits and incentives).
21. Pub. L. No. 108-173, Title XII, § 1201, 117 Stat. 2066, 2469 (Dec. 8,
2003), codified at I.R.C. § 223.
22. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 391, at 30419 (2003) (Conf. Rep.); Ann.
2007-44, 2007-19 I.R.B. 1238 (describing criteria for cut-off of Archer MSA
pilot program prescribed by I.R.C. § 220(j)). Archer MSA provisions are
retained in the Code for purposes of serving existing employer accounts, but
new Archer MSAs cannot be created beginning in 2007. I.R.C. § 220(j)(2).
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1. Eligibility: HDHP Coverage (and Only HDHP Coverage)
Coverage by an HDHP is an important prerequisite to
participation in an HSA. 23 A HDHP must satisfy limits on annual
deductibles and out-of-pocket costs as prescribed by the Code,
which are subject to annual inflation adjustments. 24 For 2014, a
HDHP requires an annual deductible that is not less than $1,250
(self-only coverage) or $2,500 (family coverage). 25 These deductible
limits are more generous to the insured than those applicable to
Archer MSA rules, which require a range of $2,200-$3,250 (single)
and $4,350-$6,550 (family). 26 Like other insurance plans offered
under the ACA, an HDHP is also subject to a limitation on annual
out-of-pocket expenses (defined to include deductibles, copayments, and other amounts, but not insurance premiums) that
does not exceed $6,350 (self-only coverage) or $12,700 (family
coverage). 27
Eligibility for HSA participation is also constrained by the
scope of other insurance coverage available to the individual. With
the exception of certain other kinds of permitted insurance, such
as specified coverage for accidents, disability, dental, vision, or
long-term care, 28 coverage under any other health plan that is not
an HDHP terminates one’s eligibility to make contributions to an
HSA. 29 Medicare coverage also terminates eligibility for continuing
HSA participation. 30
23. See I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(A) (2004) (defining eligible individual by reference
to insurance coverage, not by reference to employment status).
24. See I.R.C. §§ 223(c)(2) (2004) (defining deductible and coverage limits
for HDHPs); 223(g) (prescribing cost of living adjustments to such amounts).
25. Rev. Proc. 2013-25, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1110.
26. See Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (§ 3.25) (defining inflationadjusted amounts for Archer MSAs in 2014).
27. Rev. Proc. 2013-25, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1110. A plan may have an even
higher deductible for out-of-network services and still not violate the out-ofpocket limitation in section 223. I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(D). It should be noted that
an HDHP for an Archer MSA is subject to lower limitations on out-of-pocket
costs, $4,350 (self-only) and $8,000 (family). Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B.
537 (§ 3.25).
28. I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(B). For example, an employer could use an HRA to
offer vision, dental, and preventive care without jeopardizing HDHP coverage.
In fact, the employer could even use the HRA to allow the employee to
purchase the HDHP coverage without jeopardizing the employee’s HSA
participation. Notice 2008-59, 2008-29 I.R.B. 123 (Q&A 1). Presumably, such a
purchase after 2013 would need to involve an integrated plan, not from an
individual market. See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
29. I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(A)(ii). See also Rev. Rul. 2004-38, 2004-15 I.R.B. 717
(requiring prescription drug coverage rider to include deductible tracking
HDHP so as not to jeopardize HDHP coverage requirement).
30. See I.R.C. § 223(b)(7) (precluding any individual from HSA
participation upon the first month that he or she is entitled to benefits under
title XVIII of the Social Security Act, and for each month thereafter). Note
that for this purpose, Medicare eligibility means receipt of benefits, not merely
reaching the age for eligibility as the statute might otherwise suggest. See
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ACA requirements applicable to non-grandfathered policies,
including preventive health services that must be provided
without a deductible or copayment, are presumptively applicable
to all HDHPs offered in the current marketplace. 31 Although this
requirement might appear to create an intractable dilemma for an
insurance regime founded on high deductibles borne by the
patients, the Service has recently clarified that an otherwise valid
HDHP will not be disqualified merely because it provides required
preventive health services without imposing a deductible. 32 This is
consistent with the original legislative history enacting the HSA
regime, which recognized the possibility of preventive care
coverage in connection with a viable HDHP. 33
Although anyone covered by an HDHP is eligible to open an
HSA, the cooperation of a third party is required, as the Code
requires that an HSA be maintained in trust for the benefit of the
beneficiary. 34 A qualified independent trustee is required, 35 and
that trustee is prohibited from commingling trust assets with
other property other than for investment purposes. 36 A trust or

Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. (Q&A 2) (stating, “[u]nder [section 223(b)(7)],
mere eligibility for Medicare does not make an individual ineligible to
contribute to an HSA. Rather, the term ‘entitled to benefits under’ Medicare
means both eligibility and enrollment in Medicare.”). Medicare beneficiaries
can also participate in HSA-type accounts under so-called “Medicare
Advantage” plans, in which accounts are used to pay health care costs.
Medicare Medical Savings Account (MSA) Plans, www.medicare.gov/sign-upchange-plans/medicare-health-plans/medicare-savings-accounts/medicalsavings-account-plans.html (last visited 2/7/2014).
31. See discussion infra Part IV (discussing exemptions that include
religious employers under current regulations and others subject to injunctive
relief from the ACA obtained through litigation).
32. Notice 2013-57, 2013-40 I.R.B. 293. The notice is consistent with the
spirit of I.R.C. § 223(c)(2)(C), which states: “A plan shall not fail to be treated
as a high deductible health plan by reason of failing to have a deductible for
preventive care (within the meaning of section 1871 of the Social Security Act,
except as otherwise provided by the Secretary).” However, this reference to
section 1871 of the Social Security Act appears erroneous, as this provision
governs regulatory authority rather than defining preventive care. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395hh (2014).
33. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-391, at 839 (2003) (“A plan does not fail to
qualify as a high deductible health plan merely because it does not have a
deductible for preventive care as required under State law.”)
34. See I.R.C. § 223(d)(1) (defining the term “health savings account” as “a
trust created or organized in the United States as a health savings account
exclusively for the purpose of paying the qualified medical expenses of the
account beneficiary . . .” with additional requirements).
35. See I.R.C. § 223(d)(1)(B) (identifying that a qualified independent
trustee shall be “a bank (as defined in section 408(n) [26 USCS § 408(n)]), an
insurance company (as defined in section 816 [26 USCS § 816]), or another
person who demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Secretary that the manner
in which such person will administer the trust will be consistent with the
requirements of this section”).
36. I.R.C. § 223(d)(1)(D); Notice 2004-50, supra note 30, at Q&A 66.
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custodial arrangement ensures that the account is funded and
held for the benefit of the employee and kept independent from
employer control. This ownership feature facilitates portability for
employee-participants who leave their employment, and it also
creates the potential for savings and investment to fund health
care needs in future periods.
Trustees must conform to limitations on permissible
investments for HSA funds, 37 and they are also required to respect
maximum limits on the annual HSA contributions, other than
rollovers from other eligible health accounts. 38 However, neither
trustees nor employers are directly responsible for determining
whether HSA distributions are used for qualifying medical
expenses, which remain the responsibility of the owner of the
account. 39 Notably, the HSA trust or custodial agreement may not
restrict HSA distributions to pay only qualified medical expenses,
thus leaving this matter to the beneficiary of the account, subject
only to information reporting requirements imposed on the
fiduciary. 40
2. Funding
HSA funding can come from a variety of sources: employers
and employees can share responsibility for funding; 41 even third
parties can make gifts for that purpose. 42 The total amount of such
37. Notice 2004-50, supra note 30, at Q&A 65.
38. See id. at Q&A 73 (stating, “[e]xcept in case of rollover contributions
described in section 223(f)(5) or trustee-to-trustee transfers, the trustee or
custodian may not accept annual contributions to any HSA that exceed the
sum of: (1) the dollar amount in effect under section 223(b)(2)(B)(ii) (i.e., the
maximum family coverage deductible) plus (2) the dollar amount in effect
under section 223(b)(3)(B) (i.e., the catch-up contribution amount)”).
39. Notice 2004-2, 2004 I.R.B. 269 (Q&A 29, 30). However, fiduciaries
allowing electronic access by payment cards are required to take some
precautions to ensure that payment cards are not used to purchase
nonprescription drugs. Notice 2011-5, 2011-3 I.R.B. 314, modifying Notice
2010-57, 2010-39 I.R.B. 396.
40. Notice 2004-50, supra note 30, at Q&A 79. See also Notice 2008-59,
supra note 28, at Q&A 27 (noting that payment card access may be restricted
to health care providers, but there must be other means of access that are not
restricted “such as through online transfers, withdrawals from automatic
teller machines or check writing”).
41. Notice 2004-50, supra note 30, at Q&A 11. See also Notice 2004-50,
supra note 30, at Q&A 81 (specifying that an employer who contributes to an
employee’s HSA is not responsible for determining the maximum annual
contribution limit for that employee, but that employer must determine
whether the employee is covered under an HDHP (including whether FSAs or
HRAs provided by that employer potentially jeopardize that coverage)).
42. The legislative history suggests that a contribution from someone other
than an employer will be treated as a gift, but the contributed amount may be
deducted by the donee. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-391, at 846 (2003)
(stating, “[u]nder the conference agreement, contributions made by or on
behalf of an eligible individual are deductible by the individual. Thus, for
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funding is limited depending upon the type of HDHP coverage for
the account owner. For 2014, annual contributions to an HSA are
limited to $3,300 (self-only) or $6,550 (family). 43 Individuals age 55
and over are allowed to make an additional $1,000 contribution. 44
“Family” coverage includes anyone other than the account owner, 45
and thus may include children (dependents and eligible adult
children under age 27) and/or a spouse. 46 For married couples, the
maximum allowed for family coverage applies even if both spouses
are separately covered by a high deductible health plan. 47 Spouses
may not maintain a joint HSA, 48 but instead must coordinate their
contributions so as to comply with the limitation.
Employers who wish to contribute to an employee’s HSA can
use a section 125 cafeteria plan to facilitate their contributions
and contributions from their employees through salary reduction
agreements. 49 Although cafeteria plans generally may not offer
benefits that defer compensation, HSA accounts are specifically
exempted from this restriction despite the fact that they can entail
substantial future benefits for their owners. 50
Employers offering an HSA benefit through a cafeteria plan
example, contributions made by an eligible individual's family members are
deductible by the eligible individual to the extent the contributions would be
deductible if made by the individual.”); id. at n. 30 (“Under present law,
contributions made on behalf of another individual are generally treated as
gifts. The present-law gift tax rules apply to contributions made on behalf of
another individual.”); see also Notice 2004-2, supra note 39, at Q&A 18
(designating that contributions by a family member to an HSA are deductible
by the donee, assuming that donee is eligible for an HSA).
43. Rev. Proc. 2013-25, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1110.
44. I.R.C. § 223(b)(3).
45. I.R.C. § 223(c)(4).
46. If one spouse is otherwise covered by insurance that does not constitute
an HDHP, the other spouse may still maintain an HDHP covering himself and
his dependents, thereby preserving eligibility for HSA participation at the
family level. Notice 2004-50, supra note 30, at Q&A 31. However, if both
spouses are covered by an HDHP, the family deductible contribution limit
must be allocated between them. Id. at Q&A 32.
47. I.R.C. § 223(b)(5); see also Notice 2014-1, 2014-2 I.R.B., at Q&A 7, 8
(providing guidance as to the implementation of the joint-deduction limitation
concerning same-sex spouses). Given that two individuals with their own
dependents and their own HDHP insurance could contribute $6,550 each for
family coverage (defined as “any coverage other than self-only coverage”,
I.R.C. § 223(c)(5)), marriage would potentially reduce the total eligible amount
of HSA contributions. However, it might also permit savings by combining
coverage for some families into one policy.
48. Notice 2004-50, supra note 30, at Q&A 63.
49. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1(a)(3)(J), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007)
(designating that HSA contributions are qualified benefits). Cafeteria plans
allow employees to acquire eligible benefits that might otherwise constitute
taxable income under the income tax doctrine of constructive receipt. See id.
§ 1.125-1(b).
50. I.R.C. § 125(d)(2)(D); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1(o)(3)(iv), 72 Fed. Reg.
43938, 43959 (2007).
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are required to describe those contribution benefits and allow
employee participants to change their salary reduction elections. 51
Generally speaking, but for section 125 of the Code, a salary
reduction agreement would otherwise result in constructive receipt
of salary income by the employee, followed by that employee’s
acquisition of a benefit for which a deduction might be allowable to
that employee. 52 However, a section 125 cafeteria plan changes the
fundamental nature of this transaction. Not only does it allow the
employer to contribute toward employee benefits without taxable
income to the employee, but it also effectively converts the
employee’s salary reduction agreement into an employer
contribution. 53
Employers and employees may also fund an employee’s HSA
account without using a section 125 cafeteria plan. 54 Contributions
in this form ultimately achieve similar income tax treatment for
both the employer and the employee, including deduction for the
employer and exclusion from the employee’s gross income. 55
However, as discussed below, employee contributions outside of a
cafeteria plan are subject to federal employment taxes (FICA and
FUTA), which presents a significant detriment for failing to follow
the approach based on the cafeteria plan. 56
Section 125 cafeteria plans require employers to comply with
nondiscrimination rules, which ensure that benefits are not
stacked in favor of highly compensated employees. 57 However,
such plans avoid more restrictive comparability rules in section
4980G of the Code, which are imposed on employer contributions
that occur outside of a cafeteria plan. 58
51. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2(c)(1), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007).
52. See Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1(b), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007)
(explaining role of cafeteria plan as exclusive means to avoid constructive
receipt).
53. Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1(r), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007). As those
regulations explain, “An employee’s salary reduction election is an election to
receive a contribution by the employer in lieu of salary or other compensation
that is not currently available to the employee as of the effective date of the
election and that does not subsequently become currently available to the
employee.” Prop. Reg. 1.125-1(r)(2), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007). A
discussion of the income tax issues is located in Part II.A.3.
54. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 223(a) (permitting contributions “by or on behalf of”
an eligible individual).
55. See I.R.C. §§ 162(a) (deduction for reasonable compensation); 106(d)(1)
(employee exclusion for accident and health plan benefits).
56. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the tax ramifications of a cafeteria
plan benefit).
57. I.R.C. § 125(c).
58. See Prop. Reg. 1.125-7(n), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007) (stating
that, “[i]f an employer contributes to employees' Health Savings Accounts
(HSAs) through a cafeteria plan (as defined in § 54.4980G-5 of this chapter)
those contributions are subject to the nondiscrimination rules in section 125
and this section and are not subject to the comparability rules in section
4980G. See §§ 54.4980G-0 through 54.4980G-5 of this chapter”). It should be
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Although a full comparison between nondiscrimination and
comparability rules is beyond the scope of this analysis, a cafeteria
plan may offer greater flexibility to employers to achieve their own
policy goals. For example, an employer may wish to match
employee HSA contributions in order to further incentivize
employee saving. If a match is done outside of a cafeteria plan, the
comparability rules would not be satisfied, as this would
potentially produce a dissimilar contribution among all eligible
individuals. 59 In contrast, a matching approach could potentially
pass the nondiscrimination rules applicable in a cafeteria plan. 60
Likewise, an employer plan to differentiate contributions based on
age (as correlated to likely healthcare expenditures) would not
satisfy the comparability rules, whereas a similar program could
potentially satisfy the nondiscrimination rules. 61
Comparability rules applicable to contributions outside of
section 125 cafeteria plans nevertheless permit some forms of
differential treatment. For example, an employer may choose to
pass on some of the cost savings from its employees who select
self-only coverage by making a contribution to the HSA of each
employee in that category, while making no contribution (or a
reduced contribution) to those with family coverage. 62 Such a
practice – or even the opposite policy decision to reward family
coverage – likely satisfies the comparability requirements. 63
An employer’s current-year contributions to an HSA are
taken into account as though such amounts provide first-dollar
coverage for purposes of assessing minimum value and
affordability requirements imposed by the ACA. 64 For a large
employer, this is important because of the possibility that a lowerpaid employee eligible for employer-provided coverage might
otherwise be eligible for coverage through a state Exchange on
affordability grounds, thereby triggering an employer penalty. 65
noted that the ACA made a simplified cafeteria plan design available for small
employers, generally defined to include those with fewer than 100 employees
during the past two years. I.R.C. § 125(j).
59. I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-33 I.R.B. 196 (Q&A 46). Differential
contributions for employees having comparable coverage present the threat of
a 35 percent excise tax on the employer’s entire HSA contribution. I.R.C.
§ 4980G; Treas. Reg. § 54.4890G-1.
60. I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, supra note 59, at Q&A 47.
61. See id. at Q&A 49, 50.
62. See Whitney R. Johnson, HSA Programs for Groups: Employer Versus
Employee Responsibilities, 28 BENEFITS Q. 43, 46-47 (Third Quarter, 2012)
(discussing the options of employers in relation to various types of employee
coverage).
63. Id. As this author notes, however, rewarding self-only coverage is a
common practice of employers. Id.
64. 78 Fed. Reg. 25909-01 (May 3, 2013). Presumably this does not
contemplate a salary reduction arrangement, which might also be considered
an employer contribution.
65. See generally Edward A. Morse, Lifting the Fog: Navigating the
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Some commentators have suggested that a small employer
may have a different incentive in providing insurance coverage
that fails affordability or minimum value requirements, which
would still allow lower-paid workers access to coverage through a
state Exchange with the benefit of premium subsidies. 66 This
would presumably require the employee to reject employer
coverage altogether, as section 125(f)(3) of the Code restricts the
use of cafeteria plans to provide insurance through an Exchange,
unless the employer is otherwise eligible to acquire group coverage
through an Exchange. 67
3. Income Taxes
An HSA offers three principal income tax advantages over
other forms of private savings or earnings that might otherwise be
used to meet healthcare needs. First, individual contributions to
the account are currently deductible as an “above-the-line”
deduction. 68 This accelerates the timing of the deduction, as
compared to the deduction for medical expenses otherwise allowed
only when “paid during the taxable year.” 69 Moreover, even if a
medical expense deduction would otherwise be allowed for a direct
payment by the taxpayer, it is still an itemized deduction subject
to a limitation of ten percent of adjusted gross income. 70 Thus, the
current income tax treatment of HSA contributions essentially
allows the individual participant to prepay eligible medical costs
Penalties in the Affordable Care Act, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 207, 220-24 (2013)
(discussing employer penalties under I.R.C. § 4980H).
66. See Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-Employer
Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1958-63 (2013) (discussing employer
motivations in providing employees with different levels of coverage).
67. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 IRB 287 (Q&A 12) (discussing an
employer’s ability to provide Exchange coverage through a Code § 125 plan, in
situations where the employer’s plan operates on a plan year other than the
calendar year). I.R.C. § 125(f)(3) was added by section 1515 of the ACA. I.R.C.
§125(f)(3). As the Notice also points out, this restriction does not apply if the
employer is a “qualified employer (as defined in ACA § 1312(f)(2)) offering the
employee the opportunity to enroll through an Exchange in a qualified health
plan in a group market.” I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 IRB 287 n.11. Section
1312(f)(2)(A) of the ACA provides in part: “[t]he term ‘qualified employer’
means a small employer that elects to make all full-time employees of such
employer eligible for 1 or more qualified health plans offered in the small
group market through an Exchange that offers qualified health plans.” 42
U.S.C. § 18032(f)(2)(A). Beginning in 2017, large employers may also be
eligible to offer group plans through an Exchange. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(2)(B).
68. I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(19), 223(a).
69. I.R.C. § 213(a).
70. See I.R.C. § 213(a) (allowing deduction for medical care “to the extent
that such expenses exceed 10 percent of adjusted gross income”); I.R.C. § 63(d)
(defining “itemized deductions” in part as those allowable other than
“deductions allowable in arriving at adjusted gross income”); see also § 62(a)
(listing deductions allowable in computing adjusted gross income; medical
expenses not included in such listing).
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with pretax dollars, thus effectively monetizing the tax benefit
immediately as compared with a system that depends on allowing
deductions when the expense is paid. 71
Second, optional employer contributions can also be made on a
tax-favored basis. If an employer contributes funds to an employee’s
HSA, these funds become the employee’s property. 72 Unlike similar
cash payments to an employee, which would otherwise generally be
considered gross income to the employee, employer contributions to
an HSA are excluded from the employee’s gross income in the same
manner as employer-provided insurance coverage, whether or not
provided through a cafeteria plan. 73
When HSA funds are distributed for qualified medical
expenses, such distributions are likewise excluded from the
employee’s gross income. 74 In order to avoid any duplication of this
tax benefit, distributions from an HSA used to pay for medical
expenses are not eligible for any medical expense deduction. 75 This
tax exemption on employer contributions thus becomes a
permanent benefit when those funds are used for qualified medical
expenses. However, the exemption becomes merely a deferral if
HSA funds are distributed for any reason other than qualifying
medical expenses, as such distributions trigger regular income
taxes and may also trigger a penalty tax. 76
Third, HSA funds not currently needed for medical expense
distributions can be invested, and those investment earnings are
exempt from tax. 77 This feature of the HSA allows savings for
future medical needs beyond the current tax year, which is made
possible by vesting property rights in the individual owner.
Unfortunately, these property rights also mean that HSA balances

71. See infra part II (presenting illustrations of this benefit).
72. See I.R.C. § 223(d)(1)(E) (stating that “the interest of an individual in
the balance in his account is nonforfeitable.”)
73. I.R.C. § 106(d)(1); see also I.R.C. § 3401(a)(22) (stating that HSA
contributions under section 106(d) are excluded from wage base for employer
withholding tax purposes). Such treatment is consistent with other employerprovided health insurance benefits. See Rev. Rul. 56-632, 1956-2 C.B. 101
(discussing the exclusion from withholding requirements for employerprovided health insurance benefits for employee, spouse and dependents);
I.R.S. Notice 2010-38, 2010-20 IRB 682 (extending exclusion to employerprovided health benefits for children under age 27 under A.C.A. provisions).
74. I.R.C. § 223(f)(1).
75. I.R.C. § 223(f)(6).
76. I.R.C. § 223(f)(2). Penalties are discussed in section 223(f)(4). See I.R.C.
§ 223(f)(4) (imposing a 20% penalty on taxable distributions, other than those
for disability, death, or upon Medicare eligibility). It should be noted that this
penalty is greater than the 10% penalty imposed on premature distributions
from a retirement account, such as an IRA. See I.R.C. § 72(t). However, to the
extent the penalty tax can be avoided upon reaching Medicare eligibility, the
treatment for HSA distributions resembles a retirement account (i.e., taxable
as gross income, without penalty).
77. I.R.C. § 223(e)(1).
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are subject to claims by the IRS in collection actions, 78 as well as
claims by a former spouse in the context of divorce, who is eligible
to retain the character of the HSA after receiving an award in a
property settlement. 79
After reaching eligibility for Medicare or upon becoming
disabled, distributions not used for qualified medical expenses are
no longer subject to the 20 percent penalty tax, but are merely
treated in the same manner as other taxable income. 80 Upon the
death of the account holder, a surviving spouse named as a
beneficiary in the HSA can also retain HSA status for the
account. 81 Others who inherit an HSA must include the fair
market value in gross income, 82 albeit without any penalty taxes
for distributions other than for qualified medical expenses. 83
4. Employment Taxes
Employment tax benefits from HSA participation may also be
realized, but a FICA tax exemption is not always commensurate
with the income tax benefits outlined above. Employer
contributions to an employee’s HSA are exempt from the FICA
wage base, whether made through a cafeteria plan or directly to
the employee’s HSA. Section 3121(a)(5) defines cafeteria plan
benefits excludable from the FICA wage base as follows:
(5) any payment made to, or on behalf of, an employee or his
beneficiary . . .
(G) under a cafeteria plan (within the meaning of section
125) if such payment would not be treated as wages without
regard to such plan and it is reasonable to believe that (if
section 125 applied for purposes of this section) section 125

78. See I.R.S. CCA 200927019 (July 2, 2009) (stating IRS Chief Counsel
interpretation that HSA is “property [or] rights to property” under I.R.C.
§ 6331, and thus eligible for levy). Since the levied funds would not be used for
qualified medical expenses, the levy would thus involuntarily trigger the
additional 20% penalty tax, assuming the holder is not otherwise exempt due
to age or disability. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(4) (2012). Although distributions from
qualified retirement plans that occur on account of levy under section 6331 are
exempt from the 10% penalty applicable to early distributions, see I.R.C.
§ 72(t)(2)(A)(vii) (2012) , no similar exemption exists for the HSA.
79. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(7).
80. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(4)(B), (C). Section 9004 of ACA increased the penalty
from 10% to 20% effective in 2011.
81. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(8)(A); I.R.S. Notice 2004-2, 2004-2 IRB 269 (Q&A 31)
(stating, “[i]f the account beneficiary’s surviving spouse is the named
beneficiary of the HSA, the HSA becomes the HSA of the surviving spouse.”)
82. See I.R.C § 223(e)(8)(B); Notice 2004-2, supra note 81, at Q&A 31 (“If …
the HSA passes to a person other than the account beneficiary’s surviving
spouse, the HSA ceases to be an HSA as of the date of the account
beneficiary’s death, and the person is required to include in gross income the
fair market value of the HSA assets as of the date of death.”)
83. See I.R.C § 223(f)(4).
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would not treat any wages as constructively received[.] 84
Thus, any employer contribution (whether or not made on
account of an employee’s salary reduction agreement, which is
nevertheless treated as made by the employer) 85 is exempt from
the FICA wage base if made through a cafeteria plan.
If the employer does not offer a cafeteria plan benefit, the
employer’s contribution may nevertheless be excluded from the
FICA wage base under a different provision. Section 3121(a)(2)(B)
of the Internal Revenue Code also excludes from the FICA
definition of wages
the amount of any payment (including any amount paid by
an employer for insurance or annuities, or into a fund, to
provide for any such payment) made to, or on behalf of, an
employee or any of his dependents under a plan or system
established by an employer which makes provision for his
employees generally (or for his employees generally and their
dependents) or for a class or classes of his employees (or for a
class or classes of his employees and their dependents), on
account of . . .
(B) medical or hospitalization expenses in connection with
sickness or accident disability. 86
Administrative guidance from the IRS confirms that employer
contributions to an HSA receive parallel treatment, regardless of
whether the employer utilizes a cafeteria plan. Notice 2004-2
states in part:
Q-19. What is the tax treatment of employer contributions to
an employee's HSA?
A-19. In the case of an employee who is an eligible individual,
employer contributions (provided they are within the limits
described in A-12) to the employee's HSA are treated as
employer-provided coverage for medical expenses under an
accident or health plan and are excludable from the
employee's gross income. The employer contributions are not
subject to withholding from wages for income tax or subject to
the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), or the Railroad Retirement
Tax Act. Contributions to an employee's HSA through a
cafeteria plan are treated as employer contributions. The
employee cannot deduct employer contributions on his or her
federal income tax return as HSA contributions or as medical
expense deductions under section 213. 87

84. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(5).
85. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-1(r), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007).
86. I.R.C. § 3121(a)(2); see I.R.C. § 3306(b)(2)(B)(showing that the wage
base for federal unemployment taxes (FUTA) contains a similar exemption).
87. See Notice 2004-2, supra note 81. This is also consistent with the
legislative history. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
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Notice 2004-2 also illustrates that using a cafeteria plan
matters in a significant way for employees making contributions to
their HSAs. The transformation created by the cafeteria plan for
income tax purposes – i.e., a salary reduction arrangement
converts the employee’s contribution of his wages into a
contribution by the employer – also affects the FICA wage base. 88
The exemption granted in this context is more generous toward
the employee than a contribution through a salary reduction
agreement to a qualified cash or deferred retirement arrangement,
which does not receive an exemption from employment taxes. 89
Employee contributions to an HSA outside of an employerprovided cafeteria plan are deductible for federal income tax
purposes, 90 but they remain within the FICA wage base, as the
exemptions provided above are for employer contributions only.
Thus, an employee who establishes his/her own HSA and funds it
independently fares worse than one whose employer provides a
cafeteria plan benefit, in that he or she will be able to reduce
income taxes (i.e., through the deduction allowed in section
223(a)), but not employment taxes on contributed amounts. The
employer also likely fares worse to the extent that the employer
could have also reaped FICA tax savings from an employee’s
salary reduction agreement in a cafeteria-plan based approach. 91
Self-employed persons fare worse than employees with
cafeteria plans when taxes under the Self Employment
Contributions Act (SECA) – the counterpart to FICA taxes for the
self-employed – are computed. 92 SECA taxes are imposed on the
Modernization Act of 2003, H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, at 842 (2003) (Conf. Rep.)
(stating that “employer contributions to a health account (including salary
reduction contributions made through a cafeteria plan) are excludable from
gross income and wages for employment tax purposes to the extent the
contribution would be deductible if made by the employee . . .”)
88. See Notice 2004-2, supra note 81, at Q&A 19 (stating, “[c]ontributions
to an employee’s HSA through a cafeteria plan are treated as employer
contributions. The employee cannot deduct employer contributions on his or
her federal income tax return as HSA contributions or as medical expense
deductions under section 213.”); see also I.R.S. CCA 200117038 (April 27,
2001) (“Employer contributions to the cafeteria plan are usually made
pursuant to salary reduction agreements between the employer and the
employee in which the employee agrees to contribute a portion of his or her
salary on a pre-tax basis to pay for the qualified benefits. Salary reduction
contributions are not actually or constructively received by the participant.
Therefore, those contributions are not considered wages for federal income tax
purposes. In addition, those sums generally are not subject to FICA and
FUTA. See Sections 3121(a)(5)(G) and 3306(b)(5)(G) of the Code.”)
89. See I.R.C. § 3121(v)(1)(A).
90. See I.R.C. § 223(a).
91. This assumes that the FICA tax savings (after any income tax benefits)
on HSA contributions are greater than the administrative costs associated
with establishing a cafeteria plan.
92. See generally IRS, Self-Employment Tax (Social Security and Medicare
Taxes),
available
at
www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-
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net earnings from self-employment, as defined in section 1402(a) of
the Code. 93 The deduction allowed for HSA contribution is an
adjustment to gross income under section 62(a)(19) of the Code,
rather than a deduction attributable to a trade or business that
would reduce the net earnings from self-employment. 94
Accordingly, a self-employed person must pay SECA taxes on her
HSA contribution, although she is allowed a deduction for federal
income tax purposes for half of this payment. 95 In this sense, the
self-employed person is treated similarly to an employee without
an employer-provided cafeteria plan benefit that includes an HSA.
Self-employed partners are subject to a similar disadvantage,
as payments from the partnership to their own HSA are treated as
guaranteed payments, rather than an employer contribution on
behalf of an employee. 96 As a result, those payments are part of
the income from self-employment for SECA purposes. Like other
self-employed persons, the partner may deduct the HSA
contribution for income tax purposes, but the self-employment tax
liability remains applicable.
Within an S corporation, 2-percent shareholder-employees are
generally treated similarly to partners for income tax purposes
regarding healthcare. 97 However, they may fare better than the
partner in terms of employment taxation. The 2-percent
shareholder-employee is treated as an employee for FICA
purposes, and thus is generally taxable on FICA wages. 98
However, to the extent the employer has a benefit plan for
employees (and not just ad hoc payments for the owners), the 2percent shareholder-employee may be eligible to exclude such
amounts from the FICA wage base under the rules of section
3121(a)(2)(B). 99

B. Health FSAs
Health FSAs are employer-provided benefits designed to
reimburse qualified medical expenses 100 incurred by an employee
Employed/Self-Employment-Tax-Social-Security-and-Medicare-Taxes
(“Selfemployment tax is a tax consisting of Social Security and Medicare taxes
primarily for individuals who work for themselves. It is similar to the Social
Security and Medicare taxes withheld from the pay of most wage earners.”).
93. See I.R.C. § 1402(a).
94. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-50, 2004-2 C.B. 196 (Q&A 84).
95. 26 U.S.C. § 164(f).
96. See Notice 2005-8, 2005-1 C.B. 368 (Q&A 1, 2) (explaining the
disadvantage to self-employed partners).
97. See generally I.R.S. Notice 2008-1, 2008-2 I.R.B. 251 (discussing
healthcare tax issues in S corporations for 2-percent shareholder-employees).
98. Notice 2005-8, supra note 96, at Q&A 3.
99. Id.; see also I.R.S. Announcement 92-16, 1992-5 IRB 53 (discussing
FICA Taxation of Health Insurance Premiums for 2% Shareholder- Employees
of S Corporations).
100. I.R.C. § 213(d). After 2010, these expenses do not include
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or former employee, including her spouse, dependents, and
children under age 27 permitted to be covered under their parents’
insurance. 101 These arrangements can be funded jointly by
employers and employees. When offered to employees under a
cafeteria plan, the employer contribution is excluded from the
employee’s gross income. 102 Employees may also fund these
arrangements through electing annual salary reductions of up to
$2,500, which are likewise excluded from gross income. 103
Distributions from a Health FSA for eligible medical expenses are
likewise excluded from the gross income of the employee in the
same manner as employer-provided payments of other health
benefits. 104
As noted above, cafeteria plans may not be used to provide for
deferred compensation. 105 This statutory restriction has
nonprescription medications. See I.R.C. § 213(b). Other exceptions also apply,
including a restriction on using a health FSA to reimburse for premiums on
other healthcare insurance coverage. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(k)(4), 72 Fed.
Reg. 43938, 43959 (2007). Additional restrictions on coverage may also apply
when a health FSA is available for an employee that has an HSA to ensure
that there is no other coverage that could jeopardize HDHP coverage for the
employee. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-45, 2004-1 C.B. 971 (describing limited
purpose health FSA or post-deductible health FSA).
101. See I.R.C. § 106(c) (defining flexible spending arrangement for the
limited purpose of that section); see also I.R.C. § 105(b) (excluding employerprovided reimbursements for medical care). As amended by the Affordable
Care Act, children who have not attained age 27 as of the end of the taxable
year are also eligible for this exclusion, including flexible spending
arrangement benefits provided under cafeteria plans. I.R.S. Notice 2010-38,
supra note 73.
102. I.R.C. § 125(a). Employer contributions are not limited by the $2,500
cap in section 125(i). I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67. However, as a
practical matter, employers may prefer to benefit employees through other
means, including making higher contributions for their insurance coverage.
103. I.R.C. § 125(i)(1). This amount is indexed for inflation. I.R.C. § 125
(i)(2). The $2,500 limitation was added by PPACA effective for plan years
beginning after December 31, 2012. See Notice 2012-40, 2012-26 I.R.B. 1046
According to Notice 2012-40, prior to the enactment of section 125(i), there
was no statutory limit imposed on elective salary reductions, although plan
sponsors often imposed such limits. Id. Section 125(i)(1) does not restrict an
employer contribution, but if the employer wishes to maintain the exemption
for a health HSA from various requirements imposed on group health plans,
the employer must restrict such contributions to an amount that does not
exceed twice the employee’s salary reduction election (or, if greater, $500 plus
the salary reduction election), assuming the employer wants to avoid other
restrictions on group health plans. I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67.
104. I.R.C. §§ 125(a), 106(a), 105(b).
105. See I.R.C. § 125(d)(2)(A) (stating that the term “cafeteria plan” does
not include deferred compensation plans). Although certain exceptions are
provided, including one for health savings accounts. See I.R.C. § 125(d)(2)(D)
(stating that the general rule, that cafeteria plans do not include any plans
providing for deferred compensation, does not apply to amounts that “a
covered employee may elect to have the employer pay as contributions to a
health savings account”), no similar exception is carved out for flexible
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traditionally meant that benefits acquired through a cafeteria plan
could not be carried over to a future taxable year, and a “use-orlose” requirement has emerged to protect the tax benefits accorded
through the cafeteria plan. 106 This “use-or-lose” rule was
liberalized in 2005 when the Service formally adopted a grace
period rule, which permitted an employee to use amounts from the
previous year to pay expenses incurred during the period of up to
two months and fifteen days following the end of the plan year. 107
This grace period rule was based on other tax law, which
exempted payments made within the fifteenth day of the third
month after the taxable year in which the services were performed
from the scope of deferred compensation. 108
In 2013, the Service administratively created a new exception
to the “use-or-lose” rule by permitting an employer the option to
amend its plan to allow up to $500 of unused funds to be carried
over to the following plan year. 109 This carry-over amount does not
count against the annual indexed maximum salary reduction
amount under section 125(i) (i.e., $2,500 in 2013). 110 Moreover, if
an employer elects to permit a carry-over, the grace period of two
months and fifteen days may not be used by the employee to
increase the amount of permitted expenditures. 111
The legal authority for this new exception is dubious given
the traditional rationale for the “use-or-lose” rule noted above,
which is also reflected in proposed regulations governing FSAs. 112
While the grace period offered in 2005 had a plausible foundation
in regulations interpreting the scope of deferred compensation, the
new administrative approach arguably violates the statutory rule
against deferred compensation without the benefit of any statutory
authority. Congress in 2003 considered a provision to allow up to
$500 of unused health benefits in an FSA to the next taxable year,
but this provision was not enacted. 113 The ACA’s enactment of a
spending arrangements.
106. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-71, 2013-47 I.R.B. 532 (allowing an employee to
use remaining amounts “from the previous year . . . to pay expenses incurred
for certain qualified benefits during the period of up to two months and 15
days immediately following the end of the plan year”).
107. Id. (citing I.R.S. Notice 2005-42, 2005-1 C.B. 1204).
108. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.404(b)-1T, Q&A-2).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. (stating, “adopting this carryover provision is not permitted to
also provide a grace period”). This does not affect the practice of using a “runout” period to reimburse expenditures incurred but not processed until the
following tax year. Id.
112. See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(k)(3), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959
(2007) (explaining that reimbursement of advanced payments for orthodontia
work does not violate the deferred compensation restriction).
113. See Conference Report, Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, 2003-3 C.B. 189, H.R. REP. NO. 108-391, 2003
WL 25545955 (Nov. 21, 2003) (noting “House bill allows up to $500 of unused
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$2,500 indexed limitation in section 125(i) limits the scope of any
potential deferral through a health FSA, but otherwise has no
logical connection to the proscription against deferred
compensation in section 125(d). Thus, it does not provide authority
for such a change. 114
The $2,500 indexed limit now imposed by the ACA is applied
on an employee-by-employee basis, and does not vary based on
whether self-only or family coverage applies through another
employer-provided healthcare plan. Thus, it provides the
maximum salary reduction permitted for each employee during
the plan year, regardless of the number of individuals for which
medical expense reimbursement is proper. 115 Accordingly, each
spouse who is offered an FSA benefit by his or her employer is
permitted to participate in his/her own FSA and elect to defer
$2,500 in his/her account. 116 Couples in which both spouses have
access to an FSA are thus able to make contributions of up to
$5,000 (indexed), rather than only $2,500 in families in which only
one spouse has access to an employer-provided FSA.
The combination of the limited time period for benefits under
the “use-or-lose” approach, coupled with the statutory limits on
salary deferral benefits that can be obtained through a cafeteriastyle FSA, significantly constrains the utility of a health FSA to
fund healthcare expenditures. The permitted cap of $2,500 in
elective salary deferral is only a fraction of the deferral permitted
in an HSA, and it is not tailored to the potential needs of multiple
persons within the same family coverage who may need to draw
upon this resource.
Moreover, the “use-or-lose” feature is not conducive to saving
for the future, which leaves families subject to out-of-pocket costs
that could reach up to $12,700 at current indexed levels. The
option for saving beyond the current year is part of the incentive
structure that is behind the theory that consumer directed health

health benefits in an employee’s health FSA to be carried forward,” but such
provision was not enacted).
114. See I.R.S. Notice 2012-40, supra note 103. The notice states,
The $2,500 limit, while not addressing the ‘use-or-lose’ rule, limits the
potential for using health FSAs to defer compensation and the extent to
which salary reduction amounts may accumulate over time. Given the
$2,500 limit, the Treasury Department and the IRS are considering
whether the use-or-lose rule for health FSAs should be modified to
provide a different form of administrative relief (instead of, or in
addition to, the current 2½ month grace period rule).
Id.
115. See id. (noting that “$2,500 is the maximum salary reduction
contribution each employee may make for a plan year, regardless of the
number of individuals (for example, a spouse, dependents, or adult children)
. . . whose medical expenses are reimbursable under the employee’s health
FSA”).
116. Id.

1012

The John Marshall Law Review

[47:991

plans can contribute to cost savings through consumer choices. 117
Although the health FSA provides for some measure of consumer
autonomy by permitting consumers to make direct payments to
providers using payment card systems, the limited ability to retain
or save unused amounts may actually stimulate spending levels
above those deemed optimal by the individual, who would
rationally chose to spend rather than lose the balance of unused
salary reductions. The capacity for saving within HSAs (or, as
discussed below, HRAs) thus provides a considerable advantage
over FSAs in this respect.
Of course, it is possible to combine a health FSA with an
HSA, but the scope of FSA benefits must be constrained in order to
maintain the employee’s eligibility for HSA participation. 118 HSA
participation requires not only HDHP coverage, but also no other
coverage that is not permitted coverage. 119 For example, a
“limited-purpose health FSA” may provide reimbursement only for
vision, dental, or preventive care, which is considered permitted
coverage under section 223(c)(2)(C) of the Code. 120 Alternatively, a
“post-deductible health FSA” can reimburse an even broader range
of expenses, but those must be incurred after the minimum annual
deductible for the HDHP under section 223(c)(2)(A)(i) of the Code
has been satisfied. 121 But given the “use-or-lose” requirement
imposed on any health FSA, employee contributions through a
salary deferral agreement present some risk of loss, which
significantly detracts from their utility apart from pairing limited
or post-deductible FSAs with an HSA in order to increase the
potential for savings in such arrangements.

117. See Kratzke, supra note 7, at 370 (explaining that in order for
consumers to maximize net value of the health care services that they pay for,
there needs to be a form of “consumer-driven health care wherein consumers
directly pay for the health care they receive and reap savings when they
choose less expensive alternatives,” thus resulting in cost savings).
118. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2004-45, 2004-22 I.R.B. 971, 2004-1 C.B. 971
(describing a “limited-purpose health FSA” or a “limited-purpose HRA” that
can be combined with an HSA and not violate the HDHP coverage limitation).
119. See I.R.C. § 223(c)(1)(A) (explaining that an “eligible individual” is one
who is covered under an HDHP plan and is not covered under any health plan
that is not an HDHP or provides coverage for a benefit that is already covered
under an HDHP).
120. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(m)(3), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959
(2007) (defining a limited purpose health FSA as a health FSA which “only
pays or reimburses permitted coverage benefits” as defined in section
233(c)(2)(C)).
121. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.125-5(m)(4), 72 Fed. Reg. 43938, 43959
(2007) (explaining that a post-deductible health FSA is one that pays or
reimburses for such medical expenses as preventive care or medical expenses
incurred after the minimum annual HDHP deduction). These proposed
regulations indicate that a health FSA can also reflect a combination of these
benefits without jeopardizing HSA participation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1265(m)(5).
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C. HRAs
HRAs can be viewed as close relatives of HSAs and FSAs
because they all assist employees with financing healthcare costs
in a tax-favored manner. Like the FSA and HSA, an employer’s
payment of medical benefits through an HRA is excludable from
the employee’s gross income, thus achieving a tax-favored
approach to covering medical costs. 122
HRAs enjoy some distinctive features that also need to be
considered. Notably, an HRA must be funded solely by an
employer; salary reductions from the employee that are permitted
in an FSA or HSA offered through a cafeteria plan may not be
used to fund HRA benefits. 123 Unlike the HSA, which requires a
separate trustee or custodian to receive cash contributions funding
a trust account, an HRA may be maintained by the employer as a
purely notional account. 124 Unlike the “use-or-lose” requirement
for an FSA, unused HRA benefits may generally be carried
forward to future periods, 125 but this does not result in the same
robust property rights as in an HSA. For example, an employee
who retires or who terminates his employment relationship may
not receive the unused balance of an HRA in cash, lest such a
payment disqualify the entire HRA plan from tax-favored
treatment. 126 In many cases, the unused balance simply reverts to
122. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93 (noting exclusion from
employee gross income under sections 106 and 105 of the Code).
123. See id. at § I (stating that an HRA “is an arrangement that is . . . not
provided pursuant to salary reduction election or otherwise under a § 125
cafeteria plan”). Self-employed individuals are not eligible for an HRA. Id.
(clarifying that an HRA is an “arrangement . . . paid for solely by the
employer”).
124. See Kaiser/HRET 2013 Annual Survey of Employer Health Benefits,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 133 (2013) (hereinafter “Kaiser/HRET
Survey”), available at http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/2013-employerhealth-benefits/ (nothing that “HRAs are accounting devices, and employers
are not required to expend funds until an employee incurs expenses that
would be covered by the HRA”).
125. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67, at § II(A) (stating, “amounts
that remain at the end of the year generally can be used to reimburse
expenses incurred in later years.”) For this reason, an HRA may not be part of
a section 125 cafeteria plan, which only exempts an HSA (but not an HRA)
from this proscription against deferred compensation. I.R.C. § 125(d)(2)(A); see
also I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, supra note 122, at § IV (holding that “employer
contributions to an HRA may not be attributable to salary reduction or
otherwise provided under a § 125 cafeteria plan”).
126. Id. at § II. The mere right to receive cash other than for
reimbursement for medical care expenses disallows the tax-favored treatment
of the entire arrangement; this result does not depend on the participant
actually exercising the right. See id. (stating that “an HRA does not qualify for
exclusion under § 105(b) if any person has the right to receive cash or any
other taxable or non-taxable benefit under the arrangement other than the
reimbursement of medical care expenses”). Limited property rights in the form
of permitting a rollover contribution from an HRA or an FSA to an HSA have
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the employer, 127 although the employer may allow a former
employee to use funds for healthcare expenses. 128
The tax rules which provide the foundation for health
reimbursement arrangements have a long pedigree, despite the
fact that the IRS did not provide specific guidance involving HRAs
until a Notice issued in 2002. 129 Some roots for their tax-favored
treatment can be seen in the IRS recognition of the tax similarity
of reimbursing an employee for health insurance costs instead of
making a payment directly to an insurer, as in the case of an
employer-provided health plan. In 1961, the Service ruled that no
substantial difference existed among varying direct and indirect
approaches to making such payments for the purpose of applying
the exclusion from income under section 106 for employer-provided
accident and health plans. 130 That ruling was premised on
employee accountability to substantiate that costs had indeed been
incurred, so that the putative reimbursement did not merely
constitute another form of cash payment for services. 131 Section
105 of the Code provides a similar income tax exclusion benefit for
employees when an employer reimburses amounts incurred for
medical care. 132
In Notice 2002-45, the Service set out formal guidance to
outline the tax treatment of HRAs and limitations upon the
benefits that they provide. 133 This guidance originally

been permitted for certain taxpayers transitioning to HDHP/HSA coverage.
See I.R.S. Notice 2007-22, 2007-10 I.R.B. 670, 2007-1 C.B. 670 (discussing the
new rules, which allow for health FSA or HRA amounts to be rolled over into
an HAS in limited circumstances). However, these limited rights are not
comparable to the ownership autonomy conferred in connection with an HSA,
as discussed above.
127. See generally Joanne Sammer & Stephen Miller, Consumer-Driven
Decision: Weighing HSAs vs. HRAs, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (May 3, 2013), available at www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits
/articles/pages/hsasvshras.aspx (stating that upon termination of employment,
an HRA’s accumulated funds will “generally revert back to the employer”).
128. See Kaiser/HRET 2013 Survey, supra note 124, at 133 (noting that
“unspent funds in the HRA usually can be carried over to the next year
(sometimes with a limit). Employees cannot take their HRA balances with
them if they leave their job, although an employer can choose to make the
remaining balance available to former employees to pay for health care.”).
129. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, supra note 122 (providing information on
the tax treatment an HRA plan).
130. Rev. Rul. 61-146, 1961-2 C.B. 25.
131. See id. (distinguishing Rev. Rul. 57-33, 1957-1 C.B. 303, where
accountability was not required).
132. See I.R.C. § 105(b) (excluding certain reimbursements of amounts
expended for medical care from gross income). See also Amy B. Monahan, The
Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV.
777, 793-94 (2006) (noting that prior to Notice 2002-45, employers relied upon
law firm opinion letters in providing HRA-type benefits).
133. See I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, supra note 122 (discussing income tax
exclusions and benefits).
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contemplated that an HRA could be used not only to reimburse
expenses for medical care, but also to pay for premiums for
accident or health coverage. 134 Thus, under this pre-ACA
guidance, an HRA could be used to reimburse the cost of insurance
acquired by the employee, provided the employee substantiated
the premium amounts. Alternatively, an HRA could be used to
reimburse other health care costs not covered by insurance in
connection with an employer-provided plan, much like a FSA. As
discussed below, however, new restrictions are being imposed to
curtail the use of an HRA to acquire insurance, other than
insurance from an employer’s own group health plan. 135
HRAs are creatures of administrative development, rather
than being created through a specific statutory provision. There is
no indication that Congress specifically focused upon HRAs in the
ACA, but it appears that the agencies responsible to administering
the ACA now contemplate a more limited role for HRAs in
providing insurance coverage in the post-ACA environment. The
IRS has recently issued Notice 2013-54, which expands upon prior
guidance issued in connection with the role of so-called “market
reforms” in the ACA: the requirement to offer certain preventive
services without cost sharing and a proscription against annual
dollar limits on essential benefits, both of which are effective for
group health plans in 2014. 136 As a result of this guidance, prior
practices involving the use of HRAs to reimburse an employee for
individual health coverage or the similar practice of an employer
paying individual premiums directly are effectively terminated,
thus further constraining the use of HRAs as a vehicle for
employers to deliver healthcare benefits.
As explained in the preamble to regulations issued in 2010,
When HRAs are integrated with other coverage as part of a
group health plan and the other coverage alone would comply
with the requirements of PHS Act section 2711 [i.e., the
annual limit proscription], the fact that benefits under the
HRA by itself are limited does not violate PHS Act section
2711 because the combined benefit satisfies the
requirements. 137
134. See id. at § II (explaining that “[r]eimbursements for insurance
covering medical care expenses as defined in § 213(d)(1)(D) are allowable
reimbursements under an HRA, including amounts paid for premiums for
accident or health coverage for current employees, retirees, and COBRA
qualified beneficiaries.”)
135. See infra text accompanying note 141 (explaining that non-integrated
HRAs are only available to employees covered by employer provided health
plans that meet certain requirements).
136. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67 (providing guidance on
applying the ACA to employer healthcare plans).
137. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preexisting Condition
Exclusions, Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75
Fed. Reg. 37188, 37190 (June 28, 2010) (discussing HRA integrated coverage).

1016

The John Marshall Law Review

[47:991

Stand-alone HRAs (i.e., those that are not integrated with
group health plan coverage) that are providing benefits solely to
retirees are otherwise exempted from ACA provisions, 138 but the
fate of other stand-alone HRAs in light of the annual limit
proscription was identified as a matter for further guidance. 139
On January 24, 2013, the Department of Labor issued Q&A
guidance that an HRA used to purchase coverage on the individual
market, as opposed to the employer’s group market, would not be
considered integrated and in compliance with the proscription
against annual limitations. 140 Notice 2013-54 summarizes this
guidance as follows:
In the HRA FAQs, the Departments state that an HRA is not
integrated with primary health coverage offered by an
employer unless, under the terms of the HRA, the HRA is
available only to employees who are covered by primary
group health plan coverage that is provided by the employer
and that meets the annual dollar limit prohibition. Further,
the HRA FAQs indicate that the Departments intend to issue
guidance providing that:
(a) for purposes of the annual dollar limit prohibition, an
employer-sponsored HRA cannot be integrated with
individual market coverage or with individual policies
provided under an employer payment plan, and, therefore, an
HRA used to purchase coverage on the individual market
under these arrangements will fail to comply with the annual
dollar limit prohibition; and
(b) an employer-sponsored HRA may be treated as integrated
with other coverage only if the employee receiving the HRA is
actually enrolled in the coverage, and any HRA that credits
additional amounts to an individual, when the individual is
not enrolled in primary coverage meeting the annual dollar
limit prohibition provided by the employer, will fail to comply
with the annual dollar limit prohibition. 141
This DOL guidance signaled that individual market coverage
would not be treated in the same manner as group coverage
provided by the employer for purposes of avoiding the annual
dollar limit prohibition. The Notice essentially reaffirms that
guidance, but it also permits integration to occur in connection
with an employee’s group coverage through a spouse’s employer. 142
138. See id. at 37,191 (referring to stand-alone HRAs).
139. See id. (inviting comments concerning the application of PHS
application to other stand-alone HRAs).
140. See FAQs about the Affordable Care Act Implementation Part IX, Q2
(Jan. 24, 2013), available at www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-aca11.html (explaining
that “an employer-sponsored HRA cannot be integrated with individual
market coverage” because it would violate section 2711 of PHS Act).
141. I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67, at § II.D.2.
142. See id. at § III.A.1., Q&A 4 (explaining that integration is allowed
when an employee is covered by a spouse’s employer).
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Thus, as long as an HRA is integrated with an otherwise
compliant group health insurance plan, the employer may
continue to offer an HRA to its employees without violating either
the annual limit or the preventive services requirements. In other
words, the fact that the HRA does not itself ensure that certain
preventive services are offered without cost sharing or that the
employer’s annual contribution to the HRA is a limited dollar
value does not cause the employer to violate these market reform
provisions of the ACA. 143 However, an employer that offers an
HRA to provide benefits to an employee who is not covered by an
integrated group plan, but instead is either not insured or insured
through a policy from the individual market (including an
exchange), would not be in compliance with the market reform
provisions. As explained in the Notice,
For example, a group health plan, such as an employer
payment plan, that reimburses employees for an employee's
substantiated individual insurance policy premiums must
satisfy the market reforms for group health plans. However,
the employer payment plan will fail to comply with the
preventive services requirements because (1) an employer
payment plan does not provide preventive services without
cost-sharing in all instances, and (2) an employer payment
plan cannot be integrated with any individual health
insurance policy purchased under the arrangement. 144
Treasury regulations issued before Notice 2013-54 had
specifically exempted Health FSAs from the annual dollar
limitation otherwise imposed by the ACA. 145 However, the Notice
clarifies that only an FSA offered through a cafeteria plan (which
is subject to separate funding limits through section 125(i)) avoids
the annual dollar limitation. 146 Moreover, the Notice also makes it
clear that a health FSA would fail to satisfy the ACA’s preventive
143. See id. at Q&A 6 (explaining that, in fact, this exemption for the HSA
seems to apply even if the integrated coverage is not fully in compliance with
all of the new ACA requirements because it is a grandfathered plan).
144. See id. at Q&A 3 (discussing requirements for compliance with
preventive service requirements).
145. See id. at n. 9 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2711T(a)(2)(ii)) (explaining
that HSAs, as well as the Archer MSAs, are outside the scope of these market
reforms because they are not considered group health plans). See Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act: Pre-Existing Condition Exclusions,
Lifetime and Annual Limits, Rescissions, and Patient Protections, 75 Fed.
Reg. 37188, 37190 (stating that “[b]oth MSAs and HSAs generally are not
treated as group health plans because the amounts available under the plans
are available for both medical and non-medical expenses. [Footnote omitted.]
Moreover, annual contributions to MSAs and HSAs are subject to specific
statutory provisions that require that the contributions be limited.” As
discussed in part III.B., infra, this flexibility may further contribute toward a
shift toward HDHP/HSA plans).
146. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67, at Q&A 8 (explaining that
exemption does not apply to health FSAs not offered through cafeteria plans).
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services requirements if it is not integrated with an otherwise
compliant group health plan. 147 This also constrains an employer’s
ability to provide a health FSA through a cafeteria plan without
also offering group coverage. 148 The prospect of a penalty tax on
nonconforming group health benefits by an employer looms large
in this equation. 149
With an integrated approach, the type of HRA that remains
available for use more closely resembles a FSA in terms of the
covered medical costs, which include such items as co-payments,
deductibles, as well as other medical care that does not constitute
essential health benefits. 150 However, HRA coverage still differs
from an FSA in that it may also be used to cover premiums in the
employer’s own group health plan, which is not part of the typical
health FSA benefit coverage but presumably would be offered
through a cafeteria plan. 151 In addition, while the health FSA can
be funded by employer contributions, those contributions are
limited if the health FSA is going to be offered through a cafeteria
plan. 152 For the time being, there are no similar constraints on
HRA funding. However, the excise tax on so-called “Cadillac plans”
is looming, which will ultimately affect a broad range of employer
funding practices. 153

III. PROSPECTS FOR HSAS IN THE POST-ACA WORLD
As shown in part I, above, the HSA, health FSA, and HRA
each continue to provide utility in the post-ACA environment. But
it appears that the stars are aligning in a manner that favors an
HDHP/HSA regime, albeit perhaps with health FSAs and HRAs
continuing in a supporting role. A combination of greater
restrictions on health FSAs and HRAs will cause some employers
to reassess their plans. Marketplace effects on the costs of
procuring healthcare coverage appear to be providing an even
stronger nudge toward cost containment, with higher premium
147. See id. at Q&A 7 (discussing how market reforms would apply to a
health FSA that does not qualify as an excepted benefit).
148. See id. (explaining that the Notice does not expressly state whether
group coverage through a spouse would be considered integrated for purposes
of the health FSA, but such treatment would be consistent with the HRA
treatment discussed above “with respect to each individual to whom such
failure [in compliance] relates”).
149. See I.R.C. § 4980D (explaining that a $100 tax will be imposed for
each day during the noncompliance period).
150. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67, at Q&A 4.
151. Id.; see also Q&A 7 (explaining that health FSAs are not constrained
by the annual dollar limitation or preventive services requirements to the
extent they are paired with an employer-provided group health plan).
152. See supra notes 114-16 (referring to the $2,500 limit).
153. See infra Part III.D (discussing the effect “Cadillac plans” may have
on HDHP coverage).
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costs likely translating into higher levels of consumer
responsibility for a growing portion of their healthcare
expenditures.
Part A rehearses a brief summary of ACA effects on HSAs,
health FSAs, and HRAs, most of which have been explained in
part II, above. Those familiar with these effects can skip to part B,
which surveys recent data on the comparative costs of HDHP vs.
PPO-based plans, showing the potential cost and benefit
parameters for choosing an HDHP/HSA regime. Part C illustrates
the impact of tax-based incentives on choosing the HDHP/HSA
regime and briefly examines potential welfare-enhancing benefits
from consumer autonomy outside of insurance coverage. Finally,
part D covers the looming impact of the excise tax on so-called
“Cadillac plans” effective in 2018 and its likely encouragement of
HSA participation.

A. Summary of Significant ACA Impacts
As discussed in part II, above, new restrictions imposed by
the ACA have primarily restricted the utility of the health FSA
and the HRA, but not the HSA. These restrictions include the
$2,500 indexed limitation for employee contributions to a health
FSA, which constrains their utility for patients seeking to cover
healthcare expenses not otherwise covered by insurance. 154
Integration requirements also generally constrain employers from
offering an FSA or HRA apart from also offering an employersponsored group health plan that otherwise conforms to ACA
requirements. 155 Draconian penalties for nonconforming use of
these accounts present a powerful incentive for employers to
comply with the integration rules. 156
In contrast, the HSA remains comparatively unscathed.
Although eligibility for HSA participation is linked to HDHP
coverage that must otherwise conform to ACA dictates in the same
manner as other insurance products, the HSA continues to provide
eligible participants access to tax-favored health benefits for their
out-of-pocket costs on similar terms. The HSA is not affected by
integration requirements announced in Notice 2013-54, 157 and
HSA participation rules allow an account to be maintained and
funded regardless of whether HDHP coverage comes from an
employer or some other source, including a policy acquired in the
154. See I.R.C. § 125(i) (explaining that cafeteria plan benefits will not be
treated as qualified benefits unless the plan prevents the employee from
electing a salary reduction contribution exceeding the $2,500 limit).
155. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-54, supra note 67 (discussing constraints on the
use of HRAs to deliver healthcare benefits).
156. See generally I.R.C. § 4980D (2014) (imposing a tax of “$100 for each
day in the noncompliance period with respect to each individual to whom such
failure relates”).
157. Supra notes 136-152 and accompanying text.
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individual marketplace. 158
The market reform provisions which push employers to
integrate health FSA and HRA offerings with employer-provided
insurance do not apply to HSAs, in part because the HSAs are
subject to their own integration rules found in the eligibility
requirement of section 223(a). 159 This feature may provide an
additional nudge toward HDHP coverage and HSA participation,
particularly among small employers who are tempted to drop
insurance coverage for their employees and yet still wish to
provide tax-favored assistance to their employees. 160
Employers offering group HDHP coverage through a cafeteria
plan also retain the ability to combine an HRA and/or health FSA
with an employee’s HSA benefit. For example, an employer might
offer a HDHP through a cafeteria plan along with an HSA and a
limited purpose FSA funded by salary reductions in order to
expand the total health saving benefits available to an
employee. 161 The employee enjoys a tax-free benefit from the
employer’s contribution for the HDHP and any contribution to
his/her HSA, which can be expanded if the employee also
participates in a limited purpose FSA offered by his employer. 162
Assuming family coverage and one employed spouse, the total
salary reduction contributions to the HSA could sum to $6,550
($7,550 if age 55 or over), with an additional $2,500 to a limited
purpose FSA, bringing the total to $9,050 ($10,050 if age 55 or
over). 163
The employer may expand the benefits available to the
covered employee beyond its share of the premium payments for
the HDHP and any contribution to the employee’s HSA. For
example, the employer could choose to make a contribution to a
limited purpose FSA, which is not subject to the $2,500 indexed
annual limitation for employee contributions in section 125(i),
though it may be otherwise limited through regulations. 164
158. Supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text (discussing HSA funding).
159. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 137, at
37190-91 (detailing the new rules and regulations governing HSAs and FSAs
under the Affordable Care Act for patient protection).
160. But see I.R.C. § 4980H (2014) (imposing an additional economic
barrier on employers subject to the shared responsibility payment for failing to
offer affordable minimum coverage).
161. See supra Part II.A (discussing the rules and requirements for HSAs).
162. See id. (discussing the alternatives offered by HSAs and FSAs).
163. If both spouses are over 55 and maintain separate HSAs, the total
could reach $11,050 if both spouses divide the maximum HSA contribution
plus make their respective individual $1,000 contributions on account of age.
164. Special rules relating to group health plans, Treas. Reg. § 54.9831-1(v)
(2010). More specifically, this regulation states:
Benefits provided under a health flexible spending arrangement (as
defined in section 106(c)(2)) are excepted for a class of participants only
if they satisfy the following two requirements-(A) Other group health plan coverage, not limited to excepted benefits, is

2014]

Health Accounts/Arrangements

1021

Through this device, the employee could cover non-essential
benefits such as vision, dental, and similar benefits without
tapping into the HSA, thereby preserving those funds for other
deductibles, co-payments, and out-of-pocket costs associated with
primary health coverage. The employer might offer a similar
benefit from a HRA, which would effectively add to the amount of
coverage provided in the limited purpose FSA. 165 As long as those
reimbursements are designed to avoid any jeopardy to the HDHP
coverage limitation, the employer retains flexibility to share
responsibility for the employee’s medical costs and the employee
can cover remaining expenses on a tax-favored basis, perhaps
while still saving a considerable balance in the HSA.
Instead of an HSA, some employers who offer HDHP coverage
will continue to pair insurance offerings with an integrated HRA
to which the employer contributes a fixed amount to assist the
employee with deductible costs. An HRA offering may allow
savings to the employer in comparison with an HSA contribution,
in that the actual cost of the HRA is limited to the healthcare costs
actually incurred, rather than the full cash contribution to the
HSA. 166 With this method of cost sharing, the HRA can cover
deductible amounts up to the level of the employer contribution,
but the employee must cover additional deductible amounts from
his own funds. 167 It remains to be seen whether the more
employee-friendly HSA regime, which permits employee saving
and retention of benefits, will prove more desirable than this
approach.
Given that the prescribed lower limits of deductibles for the
HDHP are relatively modest ($1,250 single or $2,500 family),
made available for the year to the class of participants by reason of their
employment; and
(B) The arrangement is structured so that the maximum benefit payable
to any participant in the class for a year cannot exceed two times the
participant's salary reduction election under the arrangement for the
year (or, if greater, cannot exceed $500 plus the amount of the
participant's salary reduction election). For this purpose, any amount
that an employee can elect to receive as taxable income but elects to
apply to the health flexible spending arrangement is considered a salary
reduction election (regardless of whether the amount is characterized as
salary or as a credit under the arrangement).
Id.; see supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text (discussing the rules for
group health plans).
165. But note that ordering rules care must also be followed where
multiple reimbursement accounts are used. See Notice 2002-45, supra note
122, at § V (providing ordering rules for HRAs and Health FSAs).
166. Supra notes 124-28, and accompanying text.
167. See Kaiser/HRET Survey, supra note 124, at 141 (“HRAs often are
offered along with a high-deductible health plan (HDHP). In such cases, the
employee pays for health care first from his or her HRA and then out-of-pocket
until the health plan deductible is met. Sometimes certain preventive services
or other services such as prescription drugs are paid for by the plan before the
employee meets the deductible.”).
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combining the HDHP/HSA approach with an employer
contribution to the HSA could potentially soften the impact of
rising deductible costs on employees. However, as discussed in
part B, below, recent data shows that employers – likely for
affordability reasons – have generally been adopting HDHP
coverage with even higher deductible limits than the statute
requires, and they are also having employees bear responsibility
for a greater share of their own healthcare costs.

B. Comparative Data on Costs and Benefits of HDHP
Coverage
As shown in Figure 1, below, the average deductible for
employer-provided coverage in 2013 is considerably higher than
the deductible limits permitted by statute – $1250 (single) or
$2,500 (family). Even so, as compared with an employer-provided
PPO plan that is not considered a HDHP, this data indicates that
employees with a HDHP are paying only slightly higher
deductibles than their counterparts covered by a PPO:
Figure 1: Average Deductibles (HDHP vs. PPO) 168
Coverage
HDHP
PPO
Difference

Single

Family

$2,003

$4,079

$799

$1,854

$1,204

$2,225

Of course, deductibles are not the only out-of-pocket expenses
that must be incurred. Co-payments among plans are generally
similar, meaning that costs that must be shared by the insured
after reaching the deductible amount are not be expected to be
significantly different between the two policy approaches. 169
However, the cost of insurance coverage is also lower for the
HDHP than for otherwise comparable PPO coverage, as shown
below in figure 2:

168. Kaiser/HRET Survey, supra note 124, Exhibit 7.7 (single) and 7.14
(family). It should be noted that some plans may have separate deductibles for
each covered person, which could also affect affordability. This is not reflected
in the above figures.
169. See id. at Exhibit 7.27 (illustrating the expected similarities in
copayments among the different plan options).
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Figure 2: Average Employee/Employer Costs for HDHP vs.
PPO (2013) 170

PPO
Average
HDHP
Average
Savings
% Savings

Employee
Portion:
Single
Family

Total
Cost:
Single

Family

$1,024

$4,587

$5,008

$12,084

$6,032

$16,671

$887

$3,649

$4,419

$11,578

$5,306

$15,227

$137

$938

$589

$506

$726

$1,444

13.38%

20.45%

11.76%

4.19%

12.04%

8.66%

Employer Average Premium Share:
PPO:
HDHP:

Employer
Portion:
Single
Family

83.02%
83.28%

72.49%
76.04%

Ratio of Family/Single Average
Premium Cost:
PPO: 2.76
HDHP:2.87

Looking only to the employee’s portion, the average family
premium savings of $938 would potentially leave the employee
with responsibility for an additional $1,287 in healthcare costs if
covered by an HDHP instead of a PPO. 171 For singles, the HDHP
potentially imposes an additional $1,067 in potential costs over the
PPO option. 172
Some of this difference between the PPO and the HDHP may
be ameliorated through other employer-provided benefits funded
by the employer’s savings from adopting a HDHP. From the data
in figure 2, above, it appears that employers are paying relatively
more of the premium cost for single coverage. However, employers
are paying a significantly higher dollar value toward family
coverage – which explains why some employers are economizing by
restricting family coverage when a spouse is eligible through
another employer. 173
An additional benefit for the HSA/HDHP approach lies in the
potential for savings practices that depend on the conferral of
property rights upon the HSA owner. The negative cost
differential for the HSA/HDHP shown above exists only if the
employee incurs healthcare costs in excess of the alternative PPO
deductible amount. As illustrated in figure 3, below, if the

170. See id. at Exhibit 6.5 (portraying the lower cost of insurance for an
HDHP plan compared to a PPO).
171. The family HDHP deductible ($2,225 more than the PPO) less the
lower premium outlay ($938 less than the PPO) equals $1,287.
172. The single HDHP deductible ($1,204 more than the PPO) less the
lower premium outlay ($137 less than the PPO) equals $1,067.
173. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, U.P.S. to End Health Benefits for
Spouses of Some Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2013), available at
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/business/ups-to-end-health-benefits-for-spousesof-some-workers.html (showing how some companies, for example UPS, are
cancelling spousal health benefits if the spouse is covered on a separate plan).
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employee remains healthy during the year, the HSA/HDHP
approach allows the employee to retain his/her share of premium
cost savings. Until the employee spends up to the alternative
deductible under the PPO plan, the employee retains the full share
of the premium costs saved under the HDHP – $938 in this
example. The savings are reduced to zero as the plan reaches the
point where insurance benefits (estimated at 80% of costs for both
the PPO and HDHP plans) reach the amount of the premium
differential. After medical expenses reach the deductible amount
under the HDHP, the differential cost reaches a maximum of $842
in this example, reflecting the maximum total disadvantage from
adopting the HDHP plan if predicted medical spending exceeds
premium savings.
Figure 3: Potential Annual Savings (Loss) from HDHP
(Family Coverage)
Healthy:
Premium
(Employee
Share)
Medical
Expense
Less:
Insurance
Benefit
Total
Medical
Cost
Out-ofPocket Cost
Savings (Loss)
in HDHP

PPO

HDHP

Less Healthy:
PPO

HDHP

Unhealthy:
PPO

HDHP

$4,587

$3,649

$4,587

$3,649

$4,587

$3,649

$1,854

$1,854

$3,026

$3,026

$4,079

$4,079

$0

$0

$938

$0

$1,780

$0

$6,441

$5,503

$6,675

$6,675

$6,886

$7,728

$1,854

$1,854

$2,088

$3,026

$2,299

$4,079

$938

$0

-$842

The amounts reflected in figure 3 above do not reflect the
impact of any tax savings achieved from a deductible premium
paid in each case. However, assuming that the employee invests
the premium savings in a HSA, thereby generating a tax
deduction for that difference, such an assumption would neutralize
any tax difference in this example.
As shown in figure 3, even the employee who chooses the PPO
will have to incur out-of-pocket costs. As the total amount of
healthcare expenditures for that employee grows, those amounts
can become significant. Although the ACA imposes a cap on the
total out-of-pocket costs, the cap of $12,700 for family coverage is a
sizable sum. Finding the resources to pay these out-of-pocket costs
presents one of the problems that the HSA is designed to address.
For an employee with PPO coverage, the combination of limited
annual contributions coupled with the “use-or-lose” character of
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the health FSA does not permit this account to provide sufficient
funds to address serious health incidents. For an employee with
HDHP coverage, the HSA offers an avenue for accumulating those
benefits during healthy years and, if the need arises, using them
when significant health costs arise.

A. Tax Benefits and Incentives
Tax benefits sweeten the deal for the HSA participant, but
that sweetness intensifies as the taxable income level (and
marginal tax rate) for the employee increases. First, employees
benefit from the exemption from FICA taxes conferred upon salary
reductions used to fund an HSA through a cafeteria plan. 174
Second, employees with a positive marginal federal income tax
rate receive a tax benefit from the income tax exemption conferred
on the salary deferral, as well as that received on any unused,
invested balance in the HSA. The current annual value of tax
incentives from HSA contributions at various levels are illustrated
in figure 4, below.
Figure 4: Employee Tax Incentives for HSA Contributions
(Cafeteria Plan)
Contribution
Level
FICA Tax
(7.65%)

$938

$3,300

$4,300

$6,550

$7,550

$71.76

$252.45

$328.95

$501.08

$577.58

$93.80

$330.00

$430.00

$655.00

$755.00

$140.70

$495.00

$645.00

$982.50

$1,132.50

$234.50

$825.00

$1,075.00

$1,637.50

$1,887.50

$328.30

$1,155.00

$1,505.00

$2,292.50

$2,642.50

$371.45

$1,306.80

$1,702.80

$2,593.80

$2,989.80

Min

$71.76

$252.45

$328.95

$501.08

$577.58

Max

$443.21

$1,559.25

$2,031.75

$3,094.88

$3,567.38

Income Tax
(10%)
Income Tax
(15%)
Income Tax
(25%)
Income Tax
(35%)
Income Tax
(39.6%)

174. The FICA wage base is capped at 117,000 in 2014, up from $113,700
in 2013. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Social Security Announces
1.5 Percent Benefit Increase for 2014 (Oct. 30, 2013), available at
www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/pr/2014cola-pr.html (announcing the increase in
benefits for 2014 and an increase in the cap from 2013). Thereafter, the tax
rate is reduced only to the Medicare tax (i.e., 1.45% on both employer and
employee). Thus, lower-earning participants below the FICA wage base limit
receive a larger tax benefit than their higher-earning counterparts when it
comes to the avoidance of the FICA tax.
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The contribution levels in figure 4 start at $938 (the average
employee share of premium savings, shown in figure 3 above),
then increase to $3,300 (maximum HSA contribution for single
coverage), $4,300 (maximum HSA contribution for single coverage
if over age 55), $6,550 (maximum HSA contribution for family
coverage), and $7,550 (maximum HSA contribution for family
coverage if over age 55). The income tax rates reflect common
federal statutory rates at various levels. As shown, the minimum
savings reflects only FICA taxes avoided, while the maximum
reflects a combination of FICA plus the income tax savings at the
maximum statutory rate, a total that potentially overstates the
FICA tax savings. 175 State and local income taxes are not reflected,
but if applicable they would add to the tax savings achieved.
It should be noted that FICA tax savings are available to both
employers and employees for properly structured contributions to
an HSA, but the self-employed person does not enjoy a comparable
exemption from SECA taxes. 176 Similarly, self-employed persons
are disadvantaged when compared to employees because they
must pay SECA taxes on their health insurance premiums, which
are deductible for federal income tax purposes but do not reduce
the computation of the SECA tax base – net income from selfemployment. 177
This differential tax treatment between employees and the
self-employed lacks a solid policy justification. The employment
tax exemption incentivizes the employer and the employee by
lowering the net employment tax cost for providing (choosing) a
qualified health benefit instead of additional cash compensation.
Under the ACA, shared responsibility payments imposed on large
employers and the individual mandate penalty provide negative
incentives that further reflect the value judgment favoring health
insurance coverage. Self-employed persons could be subject to both
sets of penalties (if they are employers), but lack the same set of
positive incentives in the form of the analogous SECA tax
exemption. This should be rectified.
Given the correlation between marginal income tax rates and
tax savings, it is not surprising that more higher-earning
participants respond to this tax incentive by contributing to an
175. It is likely that the full FICA tax savings would not be achieved by
salary reduction in many cases if the salary earnings are reflected in the tax
base necessary to generate income tax in the 35% or 39.6% brackets, since the
full FICA employment tax base in 2014 is $117,000, and any salary reduction
contribution would thus effectively be replaced by other earnings. In that case,
the employee’s share of the benefit would be limited to the Medicare tax (i.e.,
1.45% vs. 7.65%). However, it is possible under various scenarios for the full
benefit to be achieved, as in situations where the balance of earnings comes
from sources not subject to FICA taxes or in the case of dual-income spouses
where HDHP coverage is obtained by a lower-earning spouse.
176. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing HSAs rules and regulations).
177. See id. (discussing the ramifications of self-employment and HSAs).
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HSA. 178 Graduated tax rates produce the same effects in
retirement savings funded through tax-deductible contributions,
with higher marginal tax savings (and incentives) for those in
higher tax brackets. For a healthy, high-earning individual who is
otherwise contributing maximum allowable amounts to taxfavored retirement savings, 179 contributing to an HSA may
effectively expand one’s potential retirement savings by as much
as $7,500 in 2014. Given that post-retirement distributions from
an HSA are taxed in the same manner as other taxable retirement
distributions, 180 the current HSA regime is open to the criticism
that it expands tax-avoidance opportunities that are particularly
attractive for the comparatively well-off. 181
Moreover, to the extent that properly structured HSA
contributions enjoy FICA tax exemptions, HSAs may present a
preferred method for retirement savings that is particularly
attractive for those whose earnings do not exceed the FICA tax
base. Given that contributions and distributions are both exempt
from FICA taxes, while regular retirement savings contributions
are subject to FICA taxes, the HSA presents another avenue for
tax avoidance. 182
The FICA exemption from HSA participation incentivizes
participation by every employee, and particularly those who are
earning below the current $117,000 FICA wage base limit. 183 Such
178. See, e.g., Paul Fronstin, Employer and Worker Contributions to Health
Reimbursement Arrangements and Health Savings Accounts, 2006-2012, 34
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE NOTES 16, 18 (Feb. 2013) (stating,
“[g]enerally, lower-income people with an HSA are less likely to make
contributions to the account than higher-income people.”)
179. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, COLA INCREASES FOR DOLLAR
LIMITATIONS ON BENEFITS AND CONTRIBUTIONS, www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans
/COLA-Increases-for-Dollar-Limitations-on-Benefits-and-Contributions (last
visited Feb. 17, 2014) (summarizing current dollar limitations for various
retirement savings plans after applicable inflation adjustments).
180. See supra notes 78, 80 and corresponding text (detailing how
retirement distributions are taxed).
181. See Monahan, supra note 7, at 840 (discussing the tax-avoidance
opportunities created by the new health care plans); see also Calvin Johnson,
Ordinary Medical Expenses, TAX NOTES, Nov. 18, 2013, at 780 (criticizing
HSAs to the extent they permit ordinary medical expenses to be paid with
after-tax money, but justifying exclusions for insurance to the extent of
extraordinary cost levels). See also id. at 779 (stating, “[a]n exclusion of
[health insurance premiums] properly taxed is another subsidy with the
abhorrent patter in that the subsidy is more valuable for the health of the
rich, in higher tax brackets, than it is for the poor.”)
182. See I.R.C. § 223(f)(4) (2014) (detailing the 20% penalty on
preretirement non-medical distributions from an HSA). This penalty might be
viewed as a rough compensating measure for the FICA tax exemption on a
qualified contribution. But if the penalty does not apply, as in retirement
distributions, these amounts go essentially untaxed. Moreover, the penalty is
not dedicated to Social Security/Medicare purposes, as is arguably the case for
other FICA tax collections.
183. Supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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an incentive is not otherwise possible in a system rooted in the
benefits from income tax deductions, which leaves a large portion
of the earning population untaxed. As discussed above, the
employer’s share of those FICA savings may also incentivize a
benefit structure that includes a cafeteria plan to facilitate those
benefits. 184
As a policy matter, creating a special savings vehicle for
medical expenses also has value to the extent that at least some
high-earning and lower-earning individuals share a common
tendency to spend what they earn, rather than saving for future
needs which include health and retirement. This dedicated pool of
liquidity helps ameliorate that problem. 185
Moreover, by providing ownership rights to individuals, HSAs
move some citizens toward more responsible behavior for their
own health care needs, which has spillover effects for reduced
healthcare spending. 186 As explained by Bankman and his
colleagues in a recent paper, providing tax-deductible treatment
for out-of-pocket medical spending – a practice that is highly
similar to an HSA – produces two countervailing effects. On one
hand, expanding deductibility for healthcare costs likely increases
demand for healthcare by reducing its cost compared with other
goods, which must be purchased with after-tax dollars. 187 On the
other hand, this also moves health spending decisions from within
health insurance plans to the private realm, which effectively
reduces the demand for healthcare by avoiding the moral hazard
that occurs in connection with health expenditures covered by a
third-party payor. 188 According to Bankman and his colleagues,
the literature shows the second effect to be larger, thus making
welfare enhancement likely. 189 Although HSAs accelerate tax
benefits to the year of contribution, rather than waiting for the
year of payment to allow a deduction, 190 the HSA also shifts the
locus of payment outside of the insurance environment, which
arguably permits the same kind of welfare-enhancing outcome. 191
184. See supra Part II.A.4. (explaining HSA impacts on employment taxes).
185. But see Monahan, supra note 7, at 842 (criticizing HSAs as targeting
those who already have savings habits).
186. See Joseph Bankman, et al., Reforming the Tax Preference for
Employer Health Insurance, 26 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 43, 47-48
(2012) (analyzing the ramifications of a tax deduction for out of pocket
spending).
187. See id. at 48 (predicting in increase in demand as health care costs are
reduced in relation to other goods and services).
188. See id. (comparing health care spending patterns within insurance
plans to out of pocket spending).
189. See id. (estimating that moving health care spending out of insurance
plans would increase welfare).
190. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (highlighting income
tax advantages of HSAs).
191. See also William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments,
and Cross-Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U.
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Ironically, while the ACA has suffered criticism for its
tendency toward government intrusion into health care involving
the scope and extent of insurance coverage, ACA provisions
described above may also be moving more people toward greater
personal responsibility for their own healthcare spending that is
not covered by insurance. Though this offers some promise, it also
presents some concerns to the extent that otherwise insured
persons may still face significant personal costs without HSA
balances to fund them. 192
By incorporating preventive care requirements into the
integrated HDHP insurance, 193 the ACA also removes the
theoretical concern that restoring cost responsibility through a
consumer-directed approach might cause under-consumption of
preventive care, which could increase healthcare costs. 194
However, the ACA’s approach to preventive care also works
against the ACA’s goals to expand insurance coverage. Employers
with religious or other conscientiously held objections to providing
insurance that includes coverage for items such as contraception
and sterilization are contesting these requirements. Whether an
HDHP/HSA regime can provide a solution for these moral
dilemmas is discussed in part IV, below.

D. Excise Taxes on “Cadillac Plans”: Another Nudge
toward HDHPs?
In addition to imposing shared responsibility penalties for
large employers who fail to offer affordable healthcare coverage to
their employees, 195 the ACA also targets employers that offer
coverage that is deemed too generous. Section 9001 of the ACA
enacted section 4980I of the Code, which imposes a 40 percent
excise tax on any “excess benefit” associated with employersponsored health coverage beginning in 2018. 196
MEM. L. REV. 279, 369-70 (2009) (suggesting that consumer-driven health care
will increase transparency in the health care system and lead consumers to
select less costly alternatives when making health care choices).
192. See Monahan, supra note 7, at 831-32 (anticipating potential
difficulties of managing chronic health conditions if/when deductible cannot be
waived for treatment of such conditions).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (requiring coverage of certain preventive
care recommended by the United States Preventive Services Task Force, the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, and the Health Resources and Services
Administration).
194. See Monahan, supra note 7, at 831 (addressing concerns that
individuals using CDHPs may put off preventive care either to avoid paying
high deductibles or because of insufficient HSA funds). “The issue of forgoing
preventive care can be addressed through a plan design that waives the
deductible for such care . . . ” Id.
195. See generally I.R.C. § 4980H (providing for assessment of penalties on
large employers who fail to provide at least “minimal essential coverage”).
196. See generally I.R.C. § 4980I(a) (creating a tax on excess benefits
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The excise tax computation focuses on the cost of “applicable
employer-sponsored coverage,” which means “coverage under any
group health plan made available to the employee by an employer
which is excludable from the employee’s gross income under
section 106, or would be so excludable if it were employer-provided
coverage (within the meaning of such section 106).” 197 The “excess
benefit” is that which exceeds annual dollar limits of $10,200 for
self-only coverage and $27,500 based on other coverage, with
certain upward adjustments in these limits based on premium cost
experiences. 198 The excess benefit amount is determined on a
monthly basis based on the difference, if any, between the
aggregate cost of the applicable employer-sponsored coverage over
one-twelfth of the applicable annual limitation. 199
In addition to health insurance premiums, the total cost of
employer-sponsored coverage considered in computing this excess
benefit amount also includes other healthcare costs. Generally
speaking, it does not matter whether the employer or employee
pays for employer-sponsored group coverage. 200 Under specific
rules, if employer-sponsored coverage includes a health FSA,
salary deferrals from the employee plus any employer
contributions are included in computing the cost of employersponsored coverage. 201 Employer contributions to an HSA are
likewise specifically targeted for inclusion. 202 Thus, the tax
reaches into amounts that employers are typically funding,
directly or indirectly through salary deferrals, on a tax-favored
basis.
As noted, the excise tax is based on group health plan
coverage. However, the statute also targets employer contributions
to an HSA for this purpose. HSAs are generally not considered to
be group health plans. 203 However, if an employer offers an HSA
provided by employers).
197. See I.R.C. § 4980I(d)(1)(A) (defining “applicable employer-sponsored
coverage” as that which would not be included in the employee’s gross income).
Exclusions are available for stand-alone plans covering dental or vision
benefits. See I.R.C. § 4980I(d)(1)(B)(ii) (exempting dental and vision plans).
198. See I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(2), (3) (providing for the calculation of the
monthly excess amount and the annual limitation of the excess benefit).
Certain other adjustments may also be applied, including those for age and
gender features of the plan, and expanded limits for insureds who are engaged
in high risk professions. See I.R.C. § 4890I(b)(3)(C)(iii), (iv) (allowing for the
adjustments for the age, gender and high risk categories). For years after
2018, cost of living adjustments apply incrementally to the adjustment
computed for 2018. See I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(v) (establishing the calculation
for incremental increases after 2018).
199. I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(2).
200. I.R.C. § 4980I(d)(1)(C).
201. I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(2)(B).
202. I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(2)(C). Archer MSA contributions are likewise
included for legacy users of these accounts. Id.
203. See 75 Fed. Reg. 37188. 37190 (stating, “Both MSAs and HSAs
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through a cafeteria plan using a salary reduction agreement, there
is arguably room to convert those salary reduction amounts into
an employer contribution – as this is what otherwise happens
within a cafeteria plan. 204 On the other hand, the excise tax rules
specifically target salary deferral agreements for health FSAs, but
refer only to employer contributions for HSAs, which arguably
suggests that an employee’s contributions to and HSA would not
be included in the excise tax base. 205 The scope of the excise tax
base thus remains somewhat uncertain on this account.
The tax will be imposed on a “coverage provider”, which for
employer-sponsored coverage under a group health plan means the
insurance issuer, not the employer. 206 To the extent that there is
more than one “coverage provider,” the tax will be allocated
between them. 207 This will occur, for example, when the employer
offers a health FSA through a cafeteria plan which is integrated
with other employer-provided coverage, triggering liability for tax
from both the insurer and the employer. 208 However, the employer
will be responsible for computing the tax and notifying the
government and insurance coverage provider of the amount due. 209
Although the stated annual limits for 2018 may seem rather
generous by today’s standards – $10,200 (individual) and $27,500
(family) – even modest annual increases in healthcare costs over
the next several years could easily push many existing plans
offered by employers into excise tax territory. 210 However, even
though insurers would nominally be responsible for a portion of
the tax, those costs would likely be shifted to the employers and
ultimately to their employees in the form of lower wages. 211
The Code prescribes that the targeted annual figures for 2018
are to be adjusted upward to the extent that cost increases for a
benchmark plan, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield standard benefit
option under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan, exceed
55 percent between 2010 and 2018 – a compounded annual rate of
approximately 5.6 percent. 212 Thereafter, inflation adjustments
generally are not treated as group health plans because the amounts available
under the plans are available for both medical and nonmedical expenses”).
204. Supra note 53, and accompanying text.
205. Compare IRC § 4980I(c)(2)(B) (including employer contributions to
Health FSAs under salary reduction arrangements in cost of applicable
employer-sponsored coverage) with IRC § 4980I(c)(2)(C) (including only
employer contributions to HSAs).
206. I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(2)(A).
207. I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(3).
208. Amy B. Monahan, Why Tax High-Cost Employer Health Plans?, 65
TAX L. REV. 749, 755-56 (2012).
209. I.R.C. § 4980I(c)(3), (4).
210. Monahan, supra note 208, at 758.
211. Id. at 756-57.
212. 1.0568 = 1.546. It should be noted that this requires the 2018 BCBS
premium to be priced based on the benefits available in 2010. But changes in
medical practices could present a significant challenge in the event that
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based on the general price level, rather than specific price
adjustments for health insurance costs, could result in further
divergence between health plan costs and the adjusted annual
limits. 213 However, if we assume conservatively that no additional
adjustment to the annual limits for 2018 will occur and project
that policy rates grow at the adjustment limit contemplated by the
statute – 55% over 2010 levels – the projected BC/BS policy costs
would nearly reach the excise tax limit for self-only coverage,
while leaving several thousand dollars for family coverage. This is
illustrated in figure 5, below:
Figure 5: BC/BS Standard Benefit Option Under Federal
Employees Health Benefits Plan
2010
Cost
(a)
Standard Option Self Only
Standard Option Self & Family

Inflated
Cost
(155%)
(b)

2018
Excise
Tax Limit
(c)

Difference
(c)-(b)

$6,458.88

$10,011.26

$10,200.00

$188.74

$14,588.64

$22,612.39

$27,500.00

$4,887.61

Of course, these premium amounts omit costs incurred
through other health benefit delivery mechanisms, including
health FSAs, which may add to the total excise tax base. While
family coverage policies have a bit more room than singles for
their costs to grow before hitting the excise tax, the message is
clear: this is no idle threat for employers.
Some employers are already contemplating the tax and
looking at ways to avoid it. 214 Wellness programs might help if
employees respond to them and insurance rates track downward
as a result of lower claims. However, raising deductibles and
imposing more costs on employees is also an effective approach
with predictable results, at least in the short run. 215 This trend
could also lead to further interest in HDHP coverage, which as
shown in figure 2, above, delivers premium cost savings over
comparable PPO plans.
certain drugs, treatments, or other care practices are no longer used.
213. I.R.C. § 4980I(b)(3)(C)(v). Monahan, supra note 208, at 762-63.
214. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, High-End Health Plans Scale Back to Avoid
‘Cadillac Tax’, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28
/business/cadillac-tax-health-insurance.html (showing that employers are
already taking precautions to avoid the tax).
215. See id. (Showing an example of a couple whose deductible was raised
from $500 to $2300 on account of employer adjustments in advance of the
excise tax). See also Monahan, supra note 208, at 761-62 (noting “the structure
of the excise tax makes it highly likely that employers will reduce the
premiums of their group plans to a level below the excise tax threshold”).
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Unfortunately, the excise tax will deprive employers of the
ability to deliver an adequate buffer to help their employees bear
the extra out-of-pocket costs through contributions toward taxfavored accounts and arrangements. Given that the excise tax
reaches employer contributions to HSAs, the marketplace may
favor migration to employees funding their own HSAs in order to
address the marginal increase in their share of healthcare costs. 216
Employers would remain free to pay their employees a higher
wage to fund those costs without paying a 40% excise tax, but
employers and employees alike would potentially pay employment
taxes on those earnings, even if employees gain an income tax
benefit from their contributions. 217
It remains to be seen whether the excise tax threat will in fact
drive health care costs down. 218 Proponents of this tax suggest
that by moving costs from an employer-based insurance system in
which patients are effectively insulated from any direct effects of
their healthcare consumption to an environment in which
consumers experience more of consequences from their healthcare
consumption will ultimately result in cost savings. 219 This
resembles the argument for cost savings through consumer
autonomy that underlies the HSA.
Unfortunately, the excise tax is designed in such a way that it
does not recognize that HSAs funded through employer
contributions can also generate the same kind of savings, while
avoiding some of the burden on employees. A better design might
allow flexibility, for example, by reducing premium costs through
higher deductibles but permitting employer contributions to an
HSA to be excluded from the excise tax base (perhaps at least for

216. And as noted above, that migration may require moving outside of
cafeteria plans, if the excise tax is interpreted to cover employee contributions
to an HSA under a salary deferral agreement.
217. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (explaining that an
employer’s contributions to an employee’s HSA are not deductible as HSA or
medical expenses).
218. See generally Monahan, supra note 208, at 758-66 (showing a useful
discussion of the complexities of whether the excise tax will drive healthcare
costs down).
219. See Monahan, supra note 208, at 760-61 (summarizing part of his
argument as shown below).
The argument is that as all of these individuals with overly-generous
health insurance overconsume medical care, overall health care
spending per insured individual rises, which in turn forces insurance
companies to raise premiums. To halt the ever-increasing premiums,
therefore, one could change the tax treatment of employer-sponsored
health insurance to stop encouraging overly-generous plans. Less
generous plans would lead to less medical consumption which in turn
would lead to lower health insurance premiums, which would lead to
more individuals being able to afford insurance. In addition, less
generous plans should also lead to higher cash wages.
Id. at 760-61.
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lower-paid employees). This would therefore allow the employer to
avoid both the excise tax under section 4980I and the shared
responsibility payment for failing to offer affordable coverage
under section 4980H. Otherwise, it appears that the excise tax has
the potential of making employer-sponsored healthcare less
affordable for many wage earners who are ineligible for subsidies
through Exchanges but must face rising deductibles and out-ofpocket costs as a consequence of the current excise tax regime. 220

IV. AN ADDITIONAL ROLE FOR HSAS: RESOLVING MORAL
DILEMMAS AND EXPANDING FREEDOM?
HSAs may also have additional social utility besides
providing funds for payment of medical care and, if unused, for
retirement. As Professor Zelinsky has suggested in a recent essay,
these accounts may also be useful in solving moral conflicts that
arise over healthcare needs in a pluralistic society. 221 The so-called
“HHS mandate”, which includes access to contraception and
sterilization services among the preventative care services
required to be covered at no cost to insureds, 222 presents a vivid
example of emerging conflicts rooted in divergent moral beliefs
about appropriate healthcare. 223 Some insureds (and employers)
desire this kind of insurance coverage, but others object because of
intractable moral problems presented by a requirement to
purchase and/or provide compliant insurance coverage. 224
A combination of tax penalties coupled with a paucity of other
insurance options to avoid this moral conflict puts serious
economic pressure on objectors to offer conforming insurance to
their employees. The ACA imposes penalties on large employers
who choose not to offer insurance to their employees. 225
220. See David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms are Needed to Prevent
Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669
(2012) (showing other discussion of consequences of the ACA on low- and
moderate-income workers).
221. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Hobby Lobby Problem and the
HSA/HRA Solution, TAX NOTES, Sept. 9, 2013, at 1 (suggesting that HRAs
may also be used in this way, but this requires an independent administrator).
222. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventive Services, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012).
223. See Morse, supra note 65, at 232-37 (outlining a brief history of this
requirement and the emerging conflicts over its implementation).
224. Id. at 237-47.
225. See I.R.C. § 4980H (employer shared responsibility penalty). The
applicable date for these employer penalties has shifted from the date
provided in the statute, including the recent announcement of a one-year
delay for all employers until 2015. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B.
116 (stating a further announcement that employers with 50-99 employees
would enjoy another year of delay until 2016). See Shared Responsibility for
Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8543, 8543 (Feb. 12,
2014) (explaining that qualifying employers may be subject to penalties for
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Alternatively, an employer who offers nonconforming coverage
may face a penalty of $100/day/affected individual, which will
likely prove even more onerous than the shared responsibility
payment for not providing insurance at all. 226 Individuals who
wish to buy insurance (including employees who were dropped
from employer coverage on account of the mandate) face a similar
moral dilemma, in that they potentially face penalties for not
buying insurance 227 and no real option to purchase insurance
coverage that does not violate their moral or religious convictions.
The regulations implicitly recognize moral dimensions of this
coverage requirement by carving out a limited exemption for
religious employers, which many religious organizations dismissed
as inadequate because the scope of that exemption essentially
would not include many religious nonprofit organizations. 228 An
accommodation for religious nonprofit employers was eventually
broadened, so that they could become exempt from any direct
requirement to “contract, arrange, pay, or refer for contraceptive
coverage.” 229 However, the accommodation rules require the
religious organization to self-certify its religious objection to
coverage to either its insurer or its third-party administrator (for a
self-insurance plan), and in this case the insurer or administrator
becomes responsible for providing these benefits at no cost to
either the insured or to the covered employee. 230
For some nonprofits, this accommodation also proves
inadequate to address their concerns, and litigation has ensued. 231
failing to offer affordable coverage to full-time employees).
226. See I.R.C. § 4980D(b) (2005). As between the failure to offer insurance
at all and the offer of nonconforming coverage, the latter is likely to pack the
largest impact on the employer. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 1114, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 2013) (showing annual penalty under
section 4980D(b)(1) for Hobby Lobby would approach $475 million/year vs. $26
million for dropping healthcare coverage), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013);
see also Steven J. Willis, Corporations, Taxes, and Religion: The Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga Contraceptive Cases, 65 S.C. L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2013)
(questioning financial sustainability of 4980D tax in Hobby Lobby and noting
that the “economic futures” of such employers who choose not to comply
“appear grim” if relief is not granted.)
227. I.R.C. § 5000A.
228. Morse, supra note 65, at 242-44.
229. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39869, 39874 (July 2, 2013).
230. See id., (explaining that if a religious organization certifies an
objection to directly providing contraception, the insurance or the
administrator must provide the benefit).
231. See THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, www.becketfund.org
/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited February 11, 2014) (providing a current
listing of these cases); see also Ave Maria Foundation v. Sebelius, __ F. Supp.
2d __, No. 13-cv-15198, 2014 WL 117425 at *4 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (noting
“substantial division of opinion” and citing cases concerning the free exercise
claims raised by nonprofits; further noting “As the split of authorities
suggests, neither side is guaranteed victory”).
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Recently, a nonprofit corporation controlled by and operated by the
Little Sisters of the Poor, a Catholic order dedicated to serving the
elderly, brought a challenge to the accommodation that has gained
considerable notoriety. Although a federal district court refused to
grant relief to the Sisters from the certification requirements, 232
the United States Supreme Court has issued a temporary
injunction from enforcement pending appeal. 233 The Sisters’ moral
concern includes their required participation in “a scheme, the sole
purpose of which is to provide contraceptives, sterilization, and
abortifacients to [their employees and other beneficiaries]”. 234
Requiring the Sisters to provide a plan, sign the certification,
serve the certification upon the insurer or administrator, and so
forth connects them to the delivery of mandated items to the
organization’s plan beneficiaries in a way that violates their
religious beliefs – and even others outside their faith share this
concern. 235
Of course, for-profit firms also face similar conflicts between
their religious or other conscientiously held beliefs and the HHS
mandate, also causing many of these firms to seek relief through
litigation. 236 The courts of appeals have delivered inconsistent
results, 237 and the Supreme Court will soon be taking up some of
these legal arguments surrounding the scope of religious rights in

232. See, e.g., Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, __ F.
Supp. 2d __, No. 13-cv-2622-WJM-BNB, 2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo. 2013)
(refusing to grant an injunction initially).
233. Little Sisters of the Poor for the Aged v. Sebelius, Denver, Colorado,
134 S.Ct. 1022 (granting an injunction pending appeal).
234. Little Sisters of the Poor, 2013 WL 6839900, at *14.
235. See Editorial, Obamacare overreach tramples Little Sisters: Our view,
USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 2014, available at www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014
/01/12/obamacare-contraception-little-sisters-of-the-poor-editorials-debates/444
6007/ (asserting that the government’s insistence on forcing the Little Sisters
to choose between giving up their ministry of service to the dying poor or
violating the very religious beliefs that cause them to dedicate themselves to
that mission is “a political loser,” “constitutionally suspect” and “ultimately
unproductive” according to this nonsecular newspaper).
236. See Becket Fund For Religious Liberty, supra note 27 (listing pending
cases).
237. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1147(granting injunction to
for-profit corporation whose owners objected to HHS mandate on religious
grounds); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secretary, 724 F.3d 377, 389
(3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 578 (2013) (affirming the denial of
preliminary injunction on ground that for-profit, secular corporation could not
assert free exercise claim); Gilardi v. Department of Health and Human
Services, 733 F.3d 1208, 1224 (D.C. Cir., 2013) (rejecting corporate standing,
but allowing shareholder standing and reversing district court’s denial of an
injunction for the benefit of the individual owners of an S corporation);
Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 628 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting
shareholder standing and corporate free exercise claim); Korte v. Sebelius, 735
F.3d 654, 687 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding standing for both corporation and
owners and finding substantial burden on religious exercise).
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the corporate context. 238 It is likely that the courts will eventually
answer these legal questions concerning scope of protections for
religious freedom. However, those legal decisions will probably not
resolve the moral and political conflicts rooted in this kind of
mandated coverage. As recent polls indicate, Americans are deeply
divided on these matters, 239 and these divisions are likely to
continue for years to come.
The government has asserted that mandated coverage
supports its policy goals of (1) safeguarding the public health and
(2) ensuring that women have equal access to health care. 240 The
government also believes that the cost is a barrier to access for
some women, and it has chosen the insurance mandate as a means
to reduce this barrier for all insured women. 241 However, the
current legal scheme to support these policies produces a conflict
between interests in sexual liberty and religious liberty, in which
religious liberty interests are forced to concede.
Many employers apparently agree with these policy goals and
willingly provided contraception coverage prior to the ACA. 242
Likewise, many employees desire such coverage and may be
pleased with the effects of the law. But those who object – both
nonprofit and for-profit employers, as well as individuals with
religious or conscientious objections to purchasing such coverage –
are losers in this scheme. They will effectively be coerced by
penalties and other economic disadvantages to participate in a
238. Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1147; Conestoga Wood Specialties,
724 F.3d at 389.
239. See Public Poll, 51% Oppose Health Law’s Contraceptive Mandate,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Dec. 1, 2013), available at www.rasmussenreports.com
/public_content/politics/current_events/healthcare/december_2013/51_oppose_
health_law_s_contraceptive_mandate (reflecting a national scientific poll
conducted that asked likely voters this question: “Should businesses be
required by law to provide health insurance that covers all governmentapproved contraceptives for women without co-payments or other charges to
the patient?’ 51% said “No”, while only 38% said “Yes”); Lucy Madison, Poll:
Most Say Employers Should Be Allowed Not To Cover Contraception, CBS
NEWS (Dec. 14, 2012), www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-most-say-employersshould-be-allowed-not-to-cover-contraception/ (finding that 57 percent of
Americans believe that faith-based employers should be exempted from the
HHS Mandate and 51 percent of Americans believe that all employers should
be exempted from the Mandate); Ryan Steusloff, Majority Oppose HHS
Mandate, WILSON PERKINS ALLEN OPINION RESEARCH BLOG (Nov. 27, 2013),
www.wparesearch.com/uncategorized/majority-oppose-the-hhs-mandate/
(discussing that a third of likely voters polled found that 59 percent oppose the
HHS Mandate, while 35 percent approve). Notably, this poll also showed that
a majority of women ages 18 to 54 (54%) oppose the mandate. Id.
240. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care
Act, supra note 229, at 39872.
241. Id. at 39873.
242. See id. (explaining that most insurance policies predating the ACA
already covered these items). However, some of that coverage may have been
attributed to requirements under state law, rather than the ACA. Id.
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scheme that provides the means to deliver goods and services that
they find morally abhorrent.
If the courts ultimately overturn the current legal scheme in
favor of the religious freedom rights of employers and others who
dissent, this will change the identity of the winning and losing
interests in some cases. Employers who desire to provide coverage
for such items will presumably continue to do so, but some
employees of the successful objectors may be disappointed that
their employer’s religious liberty interest apparently trumps their
desire for coverage. Those employees would remain free to seek out
other employers who provide such benefits, but this admittedly
places them at a disadvantage compared to the current regime.
Employees of firms who object to employer-provided coverage for
morally objectionable items also face a dilemma of accepting that
objectionable coverage (and paying for their share of it) or
pursuing an even more costly option, including going without
insurance or changing their employers to achieve moral harmony
on the matter of insurance coverage. And of course, self-employed
individuals or others without employer-provided insurance may
likewise find it difficult, if not impossible, to seek out coverage
that does not violate their convictions due to the mandate.
People of good will can assign different weights to the
respective harms identified above. Differential assessments are
evident from the divergent results emerging in the case law noted
above, which the Supreme Court may ultimately need to resolve.
While some judges recognize a sufficient connectedness between
the legal imposition and a substantial impact on religious liberty
to grant relief, others find that link too attenuated to be
cognizable. 243
The characterization of the benefit required under the law
seems potentially important in assessing the burden or harm
associated with providing it. If insurance benefits are viewed as
another form of compensation for services, some appear willing to
dismiss the employer’s moral concern because the legal obligation
merely involves a form of payment in compensation for the
employee’s labor. Under this approach, the employee effectively
becomes an autonomous moral agent and the act of payment is
effectively treated as though it is devoid of moral consequences –
at least under the law. 244 As one dissenting judge explained in a
243. Compare Korte, 735 F.3d at 687 (finding in the majority that there is a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religious exercise and rejecting
government’s “attenuation” argument that mandate is “too loosely connected
to the use of contraception to be a substantial burden on religious exercise)
with id. at 705 (dissenting view that qualitative assessment of coercion in this
case is consistent with judicial role, and produces the opposite outcome).
244. See John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital
Cases, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 318-19 (1998) (discussing that the concepts of
formal and material cooperation of evil would challenge this simplistic
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approach, as they recognize the possibility that wrong may come from either
intentionally agreeing with the evil end chosen by the other (formal
cooperation), or materially assisting in that end while disagreeing with the
outcome (material cooperation). While formal cooperation is always wrong,
acts such as payment are designed toward a good – such as helping the
employee meet his material needs for food, shelter, etc. – and in this sense are
subjected to a balancing approach between the good desired and the collateral
consequences that might otherwise ensue. Id. This differential treatment and
balancing of goods has been described as follows:
A person formally cooperates with another person's immoral act when
he shares in the immoral intention of the other. Imagine a tenant who,
coveting the apartment of his Jewish neighbor, gives his name to the
Nazis. Formal cooperation is always immoral. Material cooperation
involves an act that has the effect of helping a wrongdoer, where the
cooperator does not share in the wrongdoer's immoral intention.
Imagine a grocer who sells food to a glutton, or a letter carrier who
delivers an extortionate threat. Material cooperation is only sometimes
immoral. We judge this by a kind of moral balancing test--weighing the
importance of doing the act against the gravity of the evil, its proximity,
the certainty that one's act will contribute to it, and the danger of
scandal to others.
Id.; see e.g., Peter P. Meringolo, Catholic Moral Teaching and Natural Law:
Changing the Way We Think About and Teach Professional Ethics, 44 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 1067, 1081 (2013) (discussing further cooperation of evil challenging
such simplistic approaches). The article comments as follows:
The key issue when analyzing cooperation with evil is whether the
cooperator intends--either as a means or an end--the wrongdoing
calculated by the principal agent. Intentional furtherance of the illicit
activity is called formal cooperation and is always prohibited.
Unintentional, or material cooperation, is not always prohibited, but
rather, is analyzed on a case-by-case basis based on a variety of factors,
including how and to what degree the action of the cooperator intersects
with and contributes to wrongdoing, the severity of the loss that would
be suffered by cooperator if she fails to cooperate, the type of evil
action(s) planned, and the risk of causing scandal to third persons.
Id.; see, e.g., Daniel J. Rudary, Note, Drafting a “Sensible” Conscience Clause:
A Proposal for Meaningful Conscience Protections for Religious Employers
Objecting to the Mandated Coverage of Prescription Contraceptives, 23 HEALTH
MATRIX 353, 363-64 (2013) (discussing further the idea of material cooperation
and evil). The note comments as follows:
While the Church teaches that the guilt of sin is normally incurred by
individual behavior, it also forbids actions that, while not specifically
sinful, lend “material cooperation” to morally dubious conduct. This
cooperation may be formal or material. Formal cooperation occurs when
one takes part in the sinful act of another and thus shares the
principal's intent to commit the offense in question. Material
cooperation, on the other hand, does not involve sinful intent. Rather, it
occurs when one gives assistance to another's sin by an act that is in and
of itself not morally wrong. Such material cooperation may be
immediate or mediate. One gives immediate material cooperation to the
sin of another when he or she takes part in the other's sinful act—albeit
the cooperator does not share the mens rea of the principal. Mediate
material cooperation, on the other hand, occurs when one performs an
act that is “preparatory to another's sin.” Accordingly, the Church would
consider facilitating access to contraception to be at least mediate
material cooperation because it facilitates conduct that is inherently
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recent case that granted relief from compliance to a for-profit
employer:
[W]hat the companies are providing is a form of employee
compensation, like wages. Handing over a paycheck to an
employee may materially facilitate the purchase of any
number of (perfectly legal) goods and services—alcohol,
lottery tickets, cigarettes, adult pornography, contraception,
abortion, and Harry Potter books, to name a few—that are
contrary to an employer's religious beliefs. Of course, an
employer typically does not know how an employee will spend
his wages. (Neither does he typically know what healthcare
decisions his employee is making.) But what if he does know?
Suppose an employee announces, “As soon as I get my
paycheck, I am going to have an abortion.” Or suppose it is
well known at the workplace that a particular employee
drinks himself blind at a local tavern every Friday night after
he gets paid. Can the employer withhold the paycheck on the
grounds that turning it over will materially assist an act that
he finds morally intolerable? Without explaining why, the
plaintiffs concede that an employer cannot do this. They do
not contend that the possibility, or even the foreknowledge,
that an employee can and will use her wages to engage in an
activity proscribed by the plaintiffs' religious beliefs
substantially
burdens
their
free
exercise
rights,
notwithstanding that the payment of wages to the employees
will facilitate the objected-to activity. 245
This analysis rejects any moral concerns based on a
connection between the payment and the behavior of the
employee. However, this jurist also went on to question her own
analogy if payment was not in cash, but in kind:
How is the provision of health insurance different? One
difference is that the employer plays some role in
establishing and administering the health care plan, as
opposed to supplying the employee with a voucher that the
employee can use to purchase his own insurance elsewhere.
But the insurance is nonetheless a component of
compensation that the employee has earned—an employee
accepts less in salary or hourly pay in exchange for benefits
like health insurance, and, in most cases, contributions have
been withheld from the employee's paycheck to further defray
the costs of that insurance. The fact that the employer in
administering the plan is treated as a fiduciary, with a
corresponding obligation to act in the employee's interest is

Id.

sinful. Theologians, however, have argued that the HHS mandate
actually threatens Catholic employers with immediate material
cooperation in evil, as they would be paying for health plans that
provide direct access to “free” contraception.)

245. Korte, 735 F.3d at 715-16 (Rovner, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
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consistent with the notion that the insurance, while provided
by the employer, belongs to the employee. 246
Although Judge Rovner would have dismissed the employer’s
concerns that the administrative and fiduciary role that is thrust
upon them substantially burdens their free exercise of religion,
that role nevertheless concerns some employers, including the
religious nonprofits challenging the mandate. Surely there are
limits to this suspension of moral considerations when employers
are required to deliver noncash benefits, as the acquisition of the
noncash benefit could clearly involve the employer in morally
objectionable behavior. 247
But if we look for a point of agreement with Judge Rovner, we
may recognize that her analysis raises a fair point – paying cash
compensation to employees who earn it is a good thing that should
not be expected to cause the employer the same degree of moral
concern as a payment in kind – the seeds of a solution to this
disagreement could emerge.
Professor Zelinsky suggests that either an HSA or an HRA
could play a role in resolving this dilemma based on pursuing this
compensation analogy:
Once those wages are paid, employees may spend the money
as they please. The [Employer], by example and persuasion,
may try to encourage employees to avoid alcohol. However, if
[an] employee wants to purchase and consume alcoholic
beverages, that is the employee’s prerogative. Similarly, if an
employee wants to expend her wages purchasing a morningafter form of contraception such as [E]lla or Plan B, the
employee is free to do so.
This analysis draws an important line: The employer’s
religious rights give way to employees’ autonomy once wages
have been paid to the employees. This, in turn, suggests a
broader solution to the problem raised by [HHS mandate
cases by for-profit employers]: Let every employer with
religious objections to contraceptives fund an independently
administered HSA or HRA for all employees. Employees can
use these HSA or HRA funds to defray any of their medical
expenses, including, but not limited to, the items to which the
employer objects. 248
246. Id. at 716 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
247. For example, suppose a future healthcare law required employers to
provide sex surrogate services for the purpose of stress reduction for their
employees. It is obvious that purchasing coupons from brothels for one’s
employees would present a moral hazard for the employer, even if the
employee had complete autonomy not to use them. Interjecting an
intermediary to make the purchases for the employer would not remove the
problem of participation in a scheme involving moral objections on many
levels, ranging from the support of sex trafficking to particular objections to
nonmarital relations.
248. Zelinsky, supra note 221, at 5.
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This proposal assumes that by restricting the employer’s
burden to that of making a payment to an account for the benefit
of the employee, this will shift the locus of moral responsibility to
the employee and resolve the moral objections of the employer. In
the case of a payment to an HSA, this position is particularly
strong, since an HSA is owned and controlled by the employee and
administered by an independent trustee or custodian; the
employer has no role in administering how these funds are
distributed once the payment is made. Moreover, the HSA can be
used for all kinds of medical care, as a source for retirement
savings, or for any purpose whatsoever if the employee is willing
to incur a penalty on the distribution when applicable. In this
sense, an employer contribution to an HSA is really very closely
analogous to the payment of cash compensation, albeit to a
different employee account than the checking account to which a
payroll deposit is otherwise made.
An HRA, on the other hand, might continue to present a
concern to the extent that the employer is involved in
administration and payment of the funds directly to the provider,
thus potentially incorporating the employer directly into a morally
objectionable transaction. Professor Zelinsky suggests that the
HRA should be administered independently from the employer to
avoid this concern. 249 However, the restricted purpose of the HRA,
including the requirement that it must be used only for medical
expense and that no other property rights inure to the employee,
arguably removes it further from the analogy to cash
compensation.
Of course, mere existence of an HSA does not necessarily
solve the government’s policy concern that cost may deter some
women from procuring contraception benefits contemplated by the
HHS mandate. The HSA must be funded with cash, which will
facilitate future payments by the employee. Employee
contributions to an HSA are tax-favored, but they are still costly.
When compared to insurer-provided benefits, an HSA will provide
cold comfort to employees who desire contraception unless the
employer makes a contribution to the account.
Government regulators and objecting employers would both
have to be willing to adapt their positions in order to allow an HSA
to provide a viable solution. First, objecting employers may need to
accept the responsibility to make a nominal cash contribution –
say $500 or $1,000 – to an HSA for their employees (or an HRA, if
that option does not trouble them). 250 This HSA contribution
would be part of a revised benefit plan that would include HDHP
coverage (which is essential for HSA participation) that did not
249. Id.
250. See Zelinsky, supra note 221, at 6 (suggesting $250 may be adequate
for this purpose).

2014]

Health Accounts/Arrangements

1043

conform to the contraception mandate. By restructuring their
employee benefit packages in this way, these employers would be
allowed to avoid otherwise applicable penalties, including the
shared responsibility penalty under section 4980H for not offering
health insurance and the more onerous penalty under section
4980D for offering nonconforming coverage.
Some objectors might argue that this contribution is akin to a
financial penalty imposed on exercising one’s religious beliefs, but
that characterization would be inapt. First, as noted above, the
required contribution would merely involve a change in form of the
employee benefits package, which would not necessarily increase
the employer’s costs. The employer would merely be changing its
coverage to a HDHP that did not offend its beliefs coupled with a
cash contribution to an HSA. Alternatively, if the employer
preferred an HRA it could use another health insurance plan. The
source of the funding could come from reducing the employer’s
contribution toward health insurance coverage, or from reducing
the employee’s cash compensation if the employer chose to do so.
In this way, the alternative would not merely be substituting a
new form of coercion upon the free exercise of religion.
Second, this alternative need not even require an objector to
self-identify as religious in order to achieve relief. While this
option may have special utility for accommodating an employer’s
religious beliefs, it should be available to everyone, not just those
with religious objections to contraceptive and sterilization
coverage. Even employers who do not personally object to such
coverage might choose to provide insurance options for their
employees that do not wish to purchase insurance with
contraceptive and sterilization benefits. 251 This approach would
therefore expand the freedom for all employees to choose the
coverage that suits them, both in terms of their desired healthcare
needs and their conscientiously held religious commitments.
Such an approach would be dramatically more tolerant than
the current scheme, which either subjects objectors to crippling
penalties for offering nonconforming coverage designed to enhance
the welfare of their employees in other healthcare matters or
coerces that objector to drop insurance coverage altogether. 252 But
it would also be more generous toward employees that disagreed
with their employers – and especially so when one considers the
scheme that might result if employers obtain judicially-imposed
251. However, this might require additional attention to comparability
and/or nondiscrimination rules to ensure that variable HSA contribution
packages for different insurance plans would remain compliant with these
rules.
252. See id. at 3 (observing that “[a] society seriously committed to
religious liberty should find a way to accommodate the Greens [i.e., the owners
of the for-profit plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby] as that society pursues important
public policies”).
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exemptions from compliance, leaving their employees without
access to equivalent preventive coverage. 253
Admittedly, this approach may require some compromises
from employees and policymakers, too. Procedures like
sterilization are likely to be more expensive than the annual
contribution made by the employer. 254 The employee might have to
save funds within the HSA in order to pay for such benefits, or
finance some of the cost from other sources. 255 However, for day-today expenses like contraception, the HSA will likely provide a
means to fund these items without compromising basic needs.
Further, instead of “free” or “no-cost” coverage, 256 the HSA
approach restores some personal autonomy and accountability for
the decision to purchase these items. Admittedly, this may deter
some purchases because the individual prefers to save funds for
retirement or use them for other forms of healthcare. But some
purchasers may also choose a generic brand or less expensive
alternative, thus reducing overall costs. Utility maximization that
occurs in the context of enhanced consumer autonomy may thus
enhance welfare, albeit not entirely in the direction that the
government policymakers might prefer. Such is the cost of giving
greater freedom in these matters. 257
Finally, there is the matter of the self-employed or other
individuals who lack employer-provided coverage. Those
purchasing insurance through an Exchange or independently may
also prefer a policy that does not cover these mandated items.
253. Of course, nothing would prevent an employer who won judicial relief
from engaging in private ordering to achieve a similar benefit for employees.
254. As many employers make HSA contributions to coincide with their
employee’s pay periods, rather than as a lump sum in advance (which could be
lost if the employee leaves his position, since that amount is owned by the
employee), the total annual contribution may not be immediately available to
an employee.
255. Other possibilities include permitting future distributions to pay for
such procedures, effectively using the HSA to make payments on a loan or to
otherwise reimburse the employee for funds advanced for this purpose,
thereby maximizing tax benefits associated with the account. After all,
monthly contraception costs should fall to zero after sterilization.
256. Someone must pay for those goods and services. This approach merely
changes the locus of responsibility for payment to a specific payor within the
healthcare ecosystem (i.e., the employee’s HSA or HRA), rather than
allocating it among the other participants (i.e., insurers, employers, and thirdparty administrators), who otherwise share a strong likelihood of shifting the
ultimate economic incidence of the cost back to employees in any event.
257. Since employers are being granted additional exemptions from their
shared responsibility payments under IRC § 4980H for failing to offer
insurance at all, it is quite clear that the government already contemplates
less than universal coverage for these contested preventive care services). Any
negative impact on preventive services from the HSA/HRA alternative
discussed above would appear to be even more modest than the impact of
these other legal and administrative choices on the total healthcare packages
available to people.

2014]

Health Accounts/Arrangements

1045

They, too, should have that option, if we are to maximize liberty
and conscience protections for all concerned.

V. CONCLUSION
Although the ACA has extended the reach of the federal
government into the marketplace for health insurance, it may also
be expanding opportunities for personal responsibility and
autonomy over some dimensions of the healthcare marketplace. As
health insurance costs continue to rise, HDHP insurance coverage
provides an attractive option to reduce premium costs in exchange
for bearing more out-of-pocket costs. Consumer-driven healthcare
options – namely the HSA and HRA – provide an attractive
solution to the problem of financing this growing amount of out-ofpocket costs.
Tax-favored treatment – extending to both income and
employment taxes if plans are carefully designed – incentivizes
both employers and employees to participate in funding these
accounts. However, self-employed persons continue to face a
disadvantage to their employee counterparts, particularly when it
comes to employment/self-employment tax incentives.
While health FSAs offer the combination of tax savings and
considerable autonomy to consumers, their “use-or-lose” feature
coupled with more stringent contribution limits under the ACA
make them less attractive than their counterparts, the HSA and
HRA. Ultimately, the opportunity to use unspent funds for
purposes other than healthcare, which is unique to the HSA, gives
the employee the greatest flexibility among these three
alternatives, and likely presents the greatest opportunity for
enhanced welfare.
However, the opportunity to reap the promise of benefits from
consumer-driven approaches – as well to experience any perils
from that approach 258 – must be tempered by the scope of
healthcare spending that is financed directly by consumers
through out-of-pocket costs, rather than insurance coverage. As
discussed above, only about 14 percent of total healthcare
expenditures for 2010 were paid out-of-pocket, and the combined
total for HSAs, HRAs, and health FSAs likely represent less than
one-seventh of that amount. 259 This total covered by HSAs, HRAs,
and health FSAs – perhaps 2 percent of total healthcare costs
based on 2010 spending levels 260 – is likely to increase as more
employers and individuals choose higher deductibles in their
plans, nudged by a combination of rising costs and looming excise
tax penalties for excess coverage. However, it is highly unlikely
that these accounts alone will prove sufficient to solve the problem
258. Monahan, supra note 7, at 814-39.
259. Supra note 6 and accompanying text.
260. $44.1 Billion (supra, note 6) / $2.186 trillion (supra, note 5) = 2.01%.
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of growing healthcare costs. Even if the benefits of consumerdirected healthcare are delivered without many of the costs, the
sheer magnitude of insured costs (either through government or
private sources) will continue to present a formidable challenge in
the foreseeable future.
Finally, the combination of a nonconforming HDHP coupled
with a partially funded HSA may present a particularly attractive
solution for the bitter conflicts emerging over mandated preventive
care coverage for contraceptives and similar services. Although
this approach might not please everyone, it deserves serious
consideration as a step toward enhancing the prospects for more
people to enjoy the kind of healthcare they want and need without
violating their conscientiously held religious convictions.

